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CHAPTER I 
Moral Hazard and Lending: Evidence from the Federal Student Loan Market 
 
Section 1 Introduction 
Moral hazard describes the increased incentives of a party to engage in risky behavior, typically 
due to the presence of insurance provided by another party. Moral hazard on the part of the 
lender has been described as one of the main culprits of the U.S. mortgage default crisis (Mian & 
Sufi, 2009). In the face of record student loan debt and default rates,1 commentators have drawn 
parallels between today’s student loan market and that of the mortgage crisis (Dynarski, 2014). 
Even so, the role of lender moral hazard in the student loan market has been relatively ignored. 
For more than fifteen years, there were two parallel systems of originating student loans. Within 
the Guarantee program (1965–2010),2 banks provided their own capital and lent to borrowers at 
terms defined by the government. In return for participation, the government guaranteed to 
purchase loans at 97% to100% of the outstanding balance in the event of default. In the Direct 
Loan program (1994–Present), the Department of Education funds the student loan. There is no 
default guarantee, and estimates suggest that ED recovers approximately 82% of the outstanding 
balance on defaulted loans (Department of Education, 2014). 
                                                          
1 That is, record default rates under the 270-day definition of default, in place since October 1998. 
2 Known as the Federal Family Educational Loan program (FFELP or FFEL program). 
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Moral hazard arises if the guarantee causes banks to change their behavior. Unlike the mortgage 
market, lender moral hazard should cause no changes in the composition of student loan 
borrowers, as eligibility is determined by the Higher Education Amendments and not by lender 
underwriting. Therefore, it is not obvious that lender moral hazard should impact borrower 
repayment. For example, in a simple framework of rational, utility-maximizing consumers, an 
individual’s optimal allocation of resources between consumption, saving, and debt repayment 
should not be influenced by the financial repercussions to the lender given the fixed terms of the 
loan. However, student loan borrowers tend to underestimate the consequences of default and 
seem unaware of their repayment options (Lochner, Stinebrickner, & Suleymanoglu, 2013), 
making the conditions ripe for intervention. I hypothesize that the government guarantee causes a 
reduction in intervention efforts when a borrower misses payments. Because borrowers lack 
information on their repayment options to avoid default, this reduced effort should lead to an 
increase in default rates. 
Guaranteed loans are not randomly allocated to students. Students select into schools and, prior 
to the elimination of the Guarantee program, schools selected into one of the loan programs. 
Between 2005 and 2007, for example, public schools made up 70% of Direct Loan schools but 
only 46% of Guarantee schools. Unobserved differences between students across schools would 
bias cross-sectional comparisons of default rates across programs. 
Over time, however, some schools switch programs. If this switching is unrelated to the 
probability of its borrowers defaulting on their student loans, a panel data model with school 
fixed effects can estimate the causal impact of participating in the Direct Loan program relative 
to the Guarantee program, among schools that switch. I identify this impact on default rates 
using two sources of plausibly exogenous variation in the allocation of federal student loans.  
2
First, investigative reports (Barnett, Julian, & Knight, 2003) and a settlement with the New York 
Attorney General (Ernst, 2007) describe a pattern of kickbacks and pay-for-play schemes 
between private lenders and financial aid officers in exchange for participating in the Guarantee 
program. These provide evidence that some schools switched programs for reasons that may be 
unrelated to their students’ ability to repay debt. 
Second, following the financial crash, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
(HCERA 2010) eliminated the Guarantee program, causing thousands of schools to switch into 
the Direct program by July 2010. To the extent that schools already participating in the Direct 
Loan program prior to HCERA form a valid control group for those schools forced to switch, I 
can identify the impact on default rates from school switching.3 
To illustrate one source of variation, consider borrowers who enroll in a school that used to 
participate in the Guarantee program and who then switched into the Direct Loan program in 
2010. Students exiting prior to 2010 will have Guarantee loans, while students first enrolling 
after 2010 will have Direct loans. Some cohorts will have a mix of loans from both programs. 
The impact of Direct Loan participation on default rates is estimated from these “switcher 
schools.” Non-switcher schools, as well as variation in the timing of school switches, are used to 
control for aggregate economic conditions, while time-varying student characteristics control for 
changes in the composition of borrowers. 
This study takes two approaches to estimating the impact of obtaining a Direct Loan relative to a 
Guarantee program loan on repayment outcomes. The first approach utilizes school-x-year 
aggregate data containing cohort default rates, choice of federal student loan program, and time-
                                                          
3 The Guarantee loan program has been discontinued from originating new loans. However, loans already originated 
through this program still exist and are currently being paid down by borrowers. 
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varying averages of student characteristics. These aggregate variables are available for more than 
ten years within the universe of schools participating in federal student loan programs.  
The second approach utilizes two student-level surveys that track cohorts of students over five-
year periods, with rich detail on the family and background characteristics of each student. The 
surveys contain administrative data on student loan repayment status, and assignment to either 
the Direct Loan or Guarantee program. 
There are tradeoffs between the two approaches. The aggregate model covers 96% of student 
loan borrowers who exit school between 2003 and 2011. However, there is measurement error in 
program assignment. Specifically, individuals within a repayment cohort must be mapped to 
previous years of school participation in each loan program, and some students are enrolled 
longer than others, or attend multiple institutions. 
The student-level surveys contain administrative loan repayment data, and there is no 
measurement error in assigning students to either Direct or Guarantee program loans. Moreover, 
the data allows me to identify repayment alternatives to default and control for individual 
borrower characteristics. The tradeoff is coverage: The student level surveys do not coincide 
with the policy change eliminating the Guarantee program, or the recent increase in income-
based repayment plan usage. Many schools are not represented in the surveys at all, and even 
fewer schools are represented in both surveys. 
Using a school-x-year panel of default rates and program participation at more than 4,500 
schools, I confirm empirically that Direct Loan participation reduces default rates by 1.1 
percentage points (12%) at less-than-four-year (LT4-year) schools. Impacts are concentrated at 
for-profit schools with high baseline default rates and low average enrollment. There is no 
4
discernible impact at four-year schools, although the small number of four-year for-profit 
schools makes estimates imprecise in that sector. 
There are numerous mechanisms through which Direct Loan participation could impact default 
rates. More frequent contact attempts by aggressive loan servicers could lead borrowers to place 
a higher priority on student loan debt repayment. Alternatively, servicers with an incentive to 
keep loans out of default may inform borrowers about alternative repayment options. The 
student-level model allows me to investigate one mechanism of default reduction. I find evidence 
that the reduction in default rates from Direct Loan participation coincides with a corresponding 
increase in the use of forbearance. I note that the student-level model does not cover the time 
period with the recent increase in the use of income-based repayment plans. 
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to a body of work that 
discusses the role of lender moral hazard and borrower default. Second, it speaks to the 
sensitivity of borrower repayment to nonfinancial interventions. Finally, this research speaks to 
education finance policy. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to consider the role of lender 
moral hazard in student loan default. This study is also the first to consider the impact of the 
elimination of the Guarantee lender program on borrower outcomes. Within the span of a few 
years, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (2010) shifted the ownership of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in student loans from the private sector to the public sector. Prior 
research has suggested that the Direct Loan program is less expensive to taxpayers than the 
Guarantee program (e.g., Lucas & Moore, 2009). To the extent that default reduction is a 
desirable goal, this has been a successful change in policy. 
5
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the relevant literature. Section 
3 gives background information on student loans and describes borrower and lender incentives to 
avoid default. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data sources, analysis sample, empirical strategy, and 
results of the aggregate model. Sections 6 and 7 describe the data sources, analysis sample, 
empirical strategy, and results of the student-level model. The paper concludes in Section 8. 
Section 2 Literature Review  
Lender moral hazard has been shown to have played a major role in the U.S. mortgage default 
crises (Mian & Sufi, 2009). This was in part through the channel of securitization, in which loans 
were originated and then sold them to investors, incentivizing lenders to reduce their screening 
efforts (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, & Vig, 2010). Thus, in the mortgage market, lender moral 
hazard led to a compositional shift in borrower quality. 
To my knowledge, the student loan default literature has neglected to consider the role of the 
lender and the loan servicer in encouraging debt repayment. Perhaps this isn’t surprising, 
considering that student loan eligibility is not determined by lender underwriting. Lender moral 
hazard should not cause compositional changes in borrower quality. Yet there is evidence from 
Canada that student loan borrowers are unaware of their numerous repayment options, and 
underestimate the consequences of default (Lochner et al., 2013). In the US, defaulted borrowers 
could not recall receiving information from their lenders (Loonin & McLaughlin, 2012), and 
could have avoided default if they had been aware of alternative repayment plans (Chopra, 
2013), making conditions ripe for lender interventions.  
The only paper I’ve seen that discussed the role of the lender in student loan default is a 
dissertation chapter (Akers, 2012). Akers also estimated the impact of Direct Loan participation 
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on borrower default rates within schools that switch. However, the sample period for this paper 
concludes prior to HCERA and therefore misses more than 3,000 schools that switched programs 
due to this policy shift. In addition, the study doesn’t make an argument for why schools switch 
programs. Akers found that Direct Loan participation raises default rates at proprietary 
institutions, which is consistent with the results of my study.  
Numerous observational studies have identified factors associated with student loan default. 
Recent summaries of the literature on default include Hillman (2014), Loonin and McLaughlin 
(2012), and Gross et al. (2009). These studies have found that degree attainment, income and 
employment, institution type, race and ethnicity, age, gender, debt levels, and attitude toward 
debt are related to default risk. For example, the Loonin and McLaughlin survey found that 47% 
of defaulted borrowers felt they shouldn’t have to repay their debt. Over 90% of these 
individuals attended for-profit schools. 
However, empirical research that can identify factors causing student loan default has been 
scarce, and for good reason. Federal regulations have made student loans homogenous across 
student populations, and changes over time tend to be coincident with meaningful changes in 
economic conditions. For example, recent increases in federal loan limits were coincident with 
the collapse of the private student loan market.  
Given this lack of variation, Ionescu (2009) carefully modeled borrower repayment incentives 
within the structure of the student loan programs. She calibrated a model to include the option of 
consolidating loans into an income-contingent repayment plan. The availability of the income-
contingent scheme allows some borrowers to lower their payments—in particular, those with low 
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incomes—and the model predicts a decline in default rates of 10 percentage points due to the 
changes.  However, the model assumes that borrowers have full information. 
Nonfinancial interventions by lenders have been shown to stimulate repayment. A field 
experiment in Uganda showed that text message reminders increased repayment rates. Many 
borrowers missed payments simply because they were unable to keep track of their payment 
schedules (Cadena & Schoar, 2011). In the United States, an intervention program from a single 
mortgage lender showed the effectiveness of lender communication and borrower education. 
Struggling borrowers were sent letters referring them to foreclosure counseling. The authors find 
that the counseling referral caused a 20% decline in foreclosure starts (Collins, Lam, & Herbert, 
2011).  
The high guarantee rate to lenders in the Guarantee program may not have given lenders 
sufficient incentive to expend resources in order to keep struggling borrowers out of default. In 
other financial markets, evidence suggests that an increased cost to the lender of loan default can 
incent the lender to communicate with the borrower. For example, there are higher rates of loan 
modification when the foreclosure process is more expensive to lenders, due to statewide laws 
(Collins et al., 2011). 
In summary, many student loan borrowers have limited knowledge of their loan terms. In other 
markets, nonfinancial interventions have been used to stimulate repayment of such borrowers. 
However, lenders need an incentive to expend resources in order to provide these interventions. 
In the student loan market, the lenders in the Guarantee program likely do not have these 
incentives. 
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Section 3  Background on Student Loan Repayment and Default4 
There are three types of federal loans students may obtain each year while enrolled: subsidized 
Stafford, unsubsidized Stafford, and PLUS loans.5 Each of these loans—whether in the Direct or 
Guarantee program—have the same published rates, limits, and eligibility.6 Once no longer 
enrolled, borrowers enter the repayment period after a six-month grace period. The default 
repayment schedule is a ten-year fixed-rate amortization with equal monthly payments over the 
life of the loan.7 Borrowers may sign up for alternative plans that could lower required monthly 
payments. However, they must make an active effort to switch.  
When borrowers are unable to make required payments, they may be eligible to enter temporary 
states of forbearance.8 Required payments are reduced, although interest accumulates at the same 
rate. Entering forbearance or alternative repayment plans could increase the total cost of the loan, 
but allows a struggling borrower to avoid penalties associated with missed payments.9  
Missing payments trigger a series of actions. First, borrowers may be penalized up to 6% per 
month on past-due balances. The lender may report late payments to credit bureaus, resulting in a 
reduced credit score for the borrower. In addition, lenders will initiate collection efforts that 
include letters and phone calls to delinquent borrowers. 
                                                          
4 Many statistics in this section are from Sallie Mae. Sallie Mae is the largest holder of Guarantee loans (over $100 
billion, more than five times the second-largest holder) and one of just four companies since 2009 to be allocated 
servicing rights by ED for Direct loans. 
5 Further description in Appendix A. 
6 To clarify, a subsidized Stafford loan does not have the same interest rate as an unsubsidized Stafford loan. 
However, a subsidized Stafford loan originated through the Direct program has the same interest rate as a subsidized 
Stafford loan originated through the Guarantee program. 
7 Prior to 2006, the default repayment plan included variable-rate loans, though borrowers could consolidate to a 
fixed-rate loan. 
8 Deferment is a special form of forbearance in which the required monthly payment is reduced to zero. While there 
are different automatic qualifiers for eligibility, I will denote “deferment or forbearance” as simply “forbearance” 
for the remainder of this paper. https://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/deferment-forbearance 
9 Alternative repayment plans include income-based or graduated repayment plans, or consolidating into an 
extended term of up to 30 years. 
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Once a borrower reaches 270 days past due, the lender has ninety days to submit a default claim. 
The borrower can then face a number of additional penalties—including an initial charge of up to 
25% of the outstanding balance, and forced repayment via wage garnishment.10 Entering default 
can also limit employment opportunities.  
In the Guarantee program, lenders are required to make a well-defined minimum effort to contact 
at-risk borrowers in order to satisfy a default claim. These efforts include one letter each month 
and up to two phone call attempts per month, between the fourth and seventh month of 
delinquency. Lenders almost always exert this minimum effort (SLM 2012).11  
A lender should use additional resources to keep borrowers out of default only if the expected 
return from doing so exceeds the expected return in default. I propose that lenders in the 
Guarantee program have a reduced incentive to expend such resources relative to the Direct Loan 
program. 
First, if lenders are unable to stimulate repayment, these incentives will be a moot point. 
However, the actions of Sallie Mae suggest that it is able to stimulate delinquent borrowers to 
recover. Specifically, Sallie Mae uses considerably more resources in dealing with delinquent 
borrowers with private student loans (no government guarantee) than in the Guarantee 
program.12 
In both the Direct and the Guarantee programs, a principal-agent problem exists. The principal in 
the Guarantee program is either the bank’s shareholders, or investors who purchased loans on the 
                                                          
10 Wages are only garnished for those earning at least thirty times the minimum wage per week. Thus, the lowest 
income borrowers may not be forced to make payments immediately. 
11 Sallie Mae uses an assumption that 99.5% of default claims are upheld, demonstrating that the minimum required 
effort to receive the government guarantee is nearly always met. 
12 These include hiring a stand-alone collections unit made up of more tenured officers, and subjecting high-risk 
borrowers to more frequent attempts at contact and default prevention interventions. In the Guarantee program, all 
delinquent borrowers receive the same treatment. 
10
secondary market. The principal in the Direct Loan program is the Department of Education (or, 
by extension, the taxpayer). In each program, the agent is represented by customer service 
representatives servicing the loans. However, the principal in the Guarantee program has less to 
lose in the event of borrower default. 
In default, at little cost, Guarantee lenders receive at least 97% of the loan balance. In addition, 
lenders collect income through late fees, and some may be hired as contractors for collection 
activities after default. In the Direct Loan program, the government only recovers $0.87 on net 
for every $1 defaulted over the life of subsidized loans. This rate falls to $0.82 and $0.74 for 
unsubsidized Stafford and PLUS loans respectively (Department of Education, 2014). 
Importantly, each of these recovery rates is meaningfully lower than 97%.  
The government may have an objective function that is not simply profit maximizing. To the 
extent that the Department of Education cares about the repayment outcomes of student loan 
borrowers, or the political repercussions of high national default rates, the relative value of a 
defaulted loan in the Direct Loan program would be even lower compared to the Guarantee 
program.  In other words, lenders in the Direct Loan program should have more incentive to 
intervene to avoid borrower default than even the gap in recovery rates suggests. 
I model the lender’s problem and use the facts described above to make predictions about 
intervention efforts across loan programs. A formal description can be found in Appendix B. 
Below, I discuss the general outline of the problem. 
When a borrower becomes delinquent, the lender must make a decision whether to expend 
resources in an intervention. There are three types of borrowers who enter delinquency. The first 
type will recover regardless of an intervention, the second will default regardless of an 
11
intervention, and the third is a marginal borrower who recovers if and only if there is an 
intervention. For the first two types, an intervention has no value to the lender. The expected 
value of providing an intervention is thus a function of three components: the fraction of 
marginal borrowers, the difference in value between a defaulted and a recovered loan, and the 
cost necessary to avoid default for a marginal borrower. 
I assume that the fraction of marginal borrowers is constant across loan programs. The net 
present value of a loan in recovery is the same across programs (because terms are essentially 
identical), and I assume that the cost necessary to recover a marginal borrower is the same across 
programs. This should hold because, in many cases, borrowers are being serviced by Sallie Mae 
for both Direct and Guarantee loans. The critical difference is that the value of a loan in default 
is greater to the lender in the Guarantee program. This leads to the prediction that Guarantee 
lenders have less incentive to expend resources for default avoidance interventions. 
A comparison of the way Sallie Mae contacts delinquent borrowers across programs suggests 
that this prediction is true. Sallie Mae created a presentation to its investors that details both the 
minimum requirements in the Guarantee program to satisfy the default claim, as well as the 
additional resources expended above the minimum. The company expends exactly the minimum 
effort for the first six months of delinquency, and only increases effort starting in the seventh 
month (SLM, 2012).13  
With regard to Direct Loans, I can only speak of information received from a Sallie Mae 
customer service representative via a personal phone call. I asked the representative if the 
Department of Education has specific requirements for how Sallie Mae must handle delinquent 
                                                          
13 Increased efforts include phone call attempts made every 2 to 3 days. 
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accounts, and was told this: “Phone calls to delinquent borrowers begin at just fifteen days past 
due. Phone calls are made typically every day.  Delinquency letters are sent out to borrowers in 
fifteen day increments.” When I asked if I could get this in writing, a supervisor unfortunately 
shut down our conversation.14  
In summary, Guarantee program lenders have a reduced financial incentive to expend resources 
on default prevention relative to the Direct Loan program. These lenders have the capacity to 
stimulate repayment among delinquent borrowers, but choose not to do so. Finally, these 
incentives are born out in the actions of the agent: Even within a single servicer, delinquent 
Direct Loan borrowers are subject to more intervention measures than are Guarantee borrowers. 
Selection into federal student loan programs is accomplished through schools, and not by 
individual students. Prior to the elimination of the Guarantee program, financial aid offices 
decided each year whether to participate in either the Direct Loan or Guarantee program, but 
rarely did they participate in both programs within an academic year. Between 2000 and 2009, 
more than 90% of schools had at least 99% of students obtain loans through a single program.15 
Schools have switched between programs in three distinct time periods. Prior to the fall of 1994, 
the only program in existence was the Guarantee program. By 1997, the Direct Loan program 
originated one-third of new federal student loans. Legislation then restricted the Department of 
Education from marketing Direct loans. Investigative reports and settlements with state 
Attorneys General suggest patterns of bribes and kickbacks between private lenders and financial 
aid offices over the next decade. From 1997 to 2007, hundreds of schools switched back to the 
                                                          
14 The Department of Education informed me that its contractual minimum requirements of DL servicers were set to 
match those in the Guarantee program, but that it could provide informal guidance, and that servicers will do 
“whatever we ask them to do.” 
15 In the 2009–10 academic year, many schools offered both types when the Guarantee program was coming to an 
end. 
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Guarantee program, while only a few dozen schools switched to the Direct program. Since July 
2010, any schools that had been Guarantee program participants were required to switch to the 
Direct Loan program. These periods are detailed in Appendix A. Figure 1 displays the fraction of 
new federal loans originated through the Guarantee program during each academic year, along 
with the announcement and effective date of the policy eliminating the Guarantee program. 
Section 4 School-x-Year Aggregate Model 
Annual two-year cohort default rates for each school participating in federal student loan 
programs are published by the Department of Education, and are available online. These data 
allowed me to observe the proportion of students who default on their loans within two years of 
entering repayment. I extended the analysis to three-year cohort default rates for the available 
period, and the results were quite similar.16 A more detailed explanation of cohort default rates is 
in Appendix A. 
The predictor of interest—school-x-year participation in the Direct Loan program—comes from 
Department of Education Title IV reports available online starting in AY 1999–2000.  These 
reports also provide the fraction of federal loans disbursed as subsidized, unsubsidized, or PLUS. 
Time-varying school-level characteristics were provided by the Institute for College Access and 
Success (TICAS). The panel includes annual data on school enrollment, demographics, and 
graduation rates.17 It also includes the income levels of dependent and independent students, the 
                                                          
16 Three-year default rates are available starting with the 2005 cohort and officially replace two-year rates starting 
with the 2012 cohort. 
17 Collected from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
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proportion of freshmen with education loans, and the average student loan amount among 
freshmen.18  
The study uses repayment cohorts 2003 through 2011, in order to have at least four years of 
federal student loan participation data for each cohort. Cohorts with fewer than thirty borrowers 
are dropped because the reported default rate is a moving average of three years instead of an 
annual rate for those small cohorts. Many schools are dropped from the analysis, although nearly 
all borrowers are captured by the following sample restrictions. 
The sample begins with 6,933 unique US-based schools, of which 5,941 ever report at least one 
default rate between 2003 and 2011. The sample size falls to 4,912 schools that have at least one 
year with at least thirty borrowers in a repayment cohort. Of these schools, 4,889 match to Title 
IV reports (in order to identify program participation) and 4,579 match to the TICAS panel of 
characteristics (in order to identify the institution level, e.g., a four-year school). The analysis 
sample is an unbalanced panel and represents 96% of the universe of borrowers in repayment 
during the sample period. Program impacts are identified from schools that switch programs. 
Table 1 displays characteristics of schools that were either Guarantee only, Direct only, or that 
switched over the full sample period. A detailed description of the switcher schools by time 
period can be found in Appendix C.  
The empirical strategy used in this study is partly a result of data availability, as well as how the 
outcome variable and key predictors are measured. This section builds up the model slowly in 
order to account for identification concerns, and then data availability and measurement. 
                                                          
18 Collected from the Financial Institutions Shared Assessments Program (FISAP). 
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In an ideal experiment, borrowers would be randomly assigned to either the Direct or Guarantee 
program, and the impact of Direct Loan participation could be measured by a simple comparison 
of the outcomes in each group.19 
(1) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖. 
In reality, estimating equation (1)—predicting an individual’s probability of default with cross-
sectional data—may lead to biased estimates of the impact of Direct Loan exposure, because 
factors correlated with Guarantee vs. Direct participation may be directly correlated with default 
likelihood. Between 2005 and 2007, for example, for-profit schools accounted for 25% of 
Guarantee program schools but only 13% of Direct Loan schools. 
Selection into loan programs is done by the school, and some schools switch programs over time. 
Equation (2) adds school fixed effects to the previous equation.   
(2) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖. 
The coefficient on 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖 represents the estimated impact of Direct Loan participation on a 
borrower’s likelihood of default within schools that switch programs over time. Switching isn’t 
random, however, and almost always goes in one direction within periods. Prior to 2008, nearly 
all switching was into the Guarantee program; but starting in 2009, all switching was into the 
Direct Loan program. Trends in the composition of borrowers over these time periods could 
confound estimates of the impact of Direct Loan participation. To account for this, equation (3) 
                                                          
19 An argument could be made for randomizing across colleges. However, the treatment from having a Direct loan 
only occurs months after leaving college. 
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adds a vector of observed student characteristics, 𝑋𝑖, as well as time trends within institution 
sectors, in order to control for changing economic conditions.20 
(3) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 + 𝜃𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖. 
The critical identifying assumption is that schools switching loan programs is unrelated to any 
unobserved variables affecting student default probability. This assumption would be violated, 
for example, if more financially literate borrowers altered their matriculation or borrowing 
decisions based on a school’s selection into the Direct Loan program. If the identifying 
assumption holds, an ordinary least squares model with school fixed effects can identify the 
impact of Direct Loan participation on default rates among schools that switched programs.21 
Student-level data is relatively scarce, particularly through the period when the Guarantee 
program was eliminated. Equation (4) aggregates the previous equation to the school-x-year 
level, and variables included are now school-x-year population means. 
(4) 𝑦𝑠𝑐 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑐 + 𝛿𝑋𝑠𝑐 + 𝜃𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑐. 
There is one key challenge to estimating this aggregate model. Specifically, cohort default rates 
are defined by the date in which students enter the repayment period, and a repayment cohort 
consists of students enrolled in a wide range of previous years. Thus, for schools that switch loan 
programs, it is not clear how much exposure each repayment cohort contributed to each loan 
program. 
To account for this challenge in measurement, I estimate a distributed lag model separately for 
four-year and LT4-year institutions. 
                                                          
20 Sector time trends assume the existence of repeated cross-sectional or panel data for this hypothetical situation. 
21 Approximately 75% of schools switch programs during the sample period, so the effects are estimated off a large 
majority of the college-going population. 
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(5) 𝑦𝑠𝑐 = 𝛼 + ∑ (𝛽𝑙𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠,𝑐−𝑙𝑁𝑙=0 + 𝛿𝑙𝑋𝑠,𝑐−𝑙) + 𝜃𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑐,  
where 𝑦𝑠𝑐 is the two-year cohort default rate for the university s repayment cohort of t as 
described above. 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠,𝑐−𝑙, is the proportion of federal loans disbursed through the Direct 
Loan program by university s, 𝑙 academic years prior to the repayment cohort. For example, for 
the 2010 repayment cohort, 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠,𝑐−0 is the proportion of loans disbursed through the 
Direct Loan program in school s during the 2009–10 academic year, while 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠,𝑐−1 
indicates the proportion disbursed in 2008–09. These values are often close to zero or one.22  The 
vector 𝑋𝑠,𝑐−𝑙 contains a series of lagged school-x-year characteristics of the student population, 
to control for college-going trends that may alter the composition of the borrower population.23  
The parameter of interest, ∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑁
𝑙=0 , represents the estimated impact on cohort default rates if all 
loans in the repayment cohort were to switch from the Guarantee program to the Direct Loan 
program. For four-year schools N is chosen to be six, and N is three for LT4-year schools, 
representing approximately 150% of normative program duration.  
School fixed effects 𝜇𝑠 accounts for time-invariant unobserved school heterogeneity that might 
affect default rates such as school and faculty quality, the distribution of student ability and 
wealth, career services, and the ability to match students to appropriate majors.  
Sector-x-cohort fixed effects 𝜃𝑐𝑐 captures unobserved heterogeneity across years that affect 
default rates, estimated separately by institutional sector. This could include economic conditions 
                                                          
22 As a check for model sensitivity, 𝛽𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠,𝑐−𝑙 is replaced with binary indicators for Direct Loan participation 
(having at least 90% of disbursed loans in that academic year being sourced through the Direct Loan program) and 
indicators for having “mixed” participation (between 10% and 90% of loans disbursed through the Direct Loan 
program). Results are very similar.  
23 The full variable list is detailed in Appendix C. 
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and legislative changes to the student loan system. An idiosyncratic error term, 𝜀𝑠𝑐, is unrelated 
to Direct Loan participation. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. 
Section 5 School-x-Year Model Results 
The model was estimated separately for four-year and LT4-year colleges to allow for the 
differences in lags necessary to map repayment cohorts to annual program participation at the 
school, and because some covariates (e.g. loan size, and the fraction of participants submitting 
ACT/SAT scores) likely have a different relationship with default across school types. For each 
institutional level, I ran two specifications to test the sensitivity of the results. The first includes 
only school and sector-x-cohort fixed effects, along with the participation indicators. The second 
specification includes lagged characteristics of the student population to control for time-varying 
changes in the composition of borrowers.   
Table 2 displays the estimated parameter of interest, ∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑁
𝑙=0 , along with the average default rate 
for schools participating in the Guarantee program over the sample period 2003–2011.24 The 
estimate ∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑁
𝑙=0  is statistically significant and negative for LT4-year colleges. The point estimate 
for the effect of Direct Loan participation on the cohort default rate for four-year colleges is 
negative, but small and statistically insignificant once characteristics of the student population 
are controlled for. Default rates for four-year colleges are already quite low relative to less-than-
four-year colleges.  
Direct Loan participation is estimated to reduce cohort default rates by 1.1 percentage points 
(12%) for LT4-year colleges. The estimate is statistically significant, meaningful, and stable with 
the inclusion of school-level covariates.  
                                                          
24 The individual lag terms are highly collinear: Even among the schools that switch, most don’t switch repeatedly. 
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I hypothesize that Direct Loan participation plays a role in reducing default rates due to lender 
incentives to provide information to struggling borrowers. High-information borrowers—as well 
as those borrowers who are not at risk of missing student loan payments—should not be affected 
by the treatment. I therefore expect differential impacts across schools with different types of 
students. Specifically, I expect impacts of Direct Loan participation to be driven by schools with 
high default rates, and by students with relatively low information on default alternatives. 
To get at this, I use the 2004/09 Beginning Postsecondary Students survey to identify which 
school types have students least likely to repay on time (either in default or forbearance), and 
among those students, which ones are the most frequently in default. Using only students with 
Guarantee loans so as not to confound the treatment, Table 3 shows that one-year and two-year 
for-profit schools have the most borrowers in either default or forbearance. In addition, these 
schools have the highest rate of borrowers in default conditional on being in either default or 
forbearance. For example, four-year private schools in August 2009 have just 13% of students 
not paying back on time, and of that 13%, just over one quarter have defaulted. At the same time, 
one-year for-profit schools have 40% of students not paying back student loans on time, and of 
that 40%, 58% have defaulted. Thus, students at LT4-year for-profit schools should have the 
greatest opportunity to be impacted by default avoidance interventions.  
Explicit modeling suggests this is true. I re-estimate equation (5) separately for each sector, and 
high/low-default schools within sector. Within a sector, a school is assigned as being in the 
lowest 50% or highest 50% default rate based on its earliest default rate in the sample period.25 I 
fully interact the lagged coefficients of interest with quantile assignments. Estimates displayed 
                                                          
25 Specifically, default rates from 2002 (pre-sample) are used. Schools without a reported default rate in 2002 are 
assigned to their default rate quantile based on their first year in the sample. I split at the median to preserve power. 
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are the sum of these interaction terms for each sector and quantile. As expected, estimates are 
small and statistically insignificant for four-year private and public schools, and I do not display 
those results here. 
Table 4 displays estimated heterogeneous impacts of Direct Loan participation across different 
types of schools. There are large, statistically significant estimated impacts for LT4-year for-
profit schools with relatively high baseline default rates. Direct Loan participation at these 
schools reduces default rates by 3.0 percentage points (25%). There is no statistically significant 
impact on schools with relatively low baseline default rates across any sector, nor are there 
significant impacts at public schools. While many students attend four-year for-profit schools, in 
the sample there are less than 200 unique schools in this sector, leading to imprecise and 
sensitive estimates.26   
Larger schools may have an increased opportunity to provide information to students.  
Specifically, there have been reports of for-profit schools with high default rates expending 
meaningful financial resources to keep their students out of default, in return for maintaining 
their status to accept federal loan and grant dollars for tuition (Kirkham, 2012). 
 I re-estimate equation (5), limiting the sample to high-default LT4-year for-profit schools and 
interacting program participation indicators with enrollment groups.27 Table 5 suggests impacts 
are of greater magnitude among these high-default for-profit schools with relatively small 
enrollment. The estimated difference in impact among high/low-enrollment schools is 3.6 
percentage points, which is meaningful and statistically significant (p = 0.02). 
                                                          
26 Estimates within each sector are available upon request. 
27 Splitting by highest and lowest 50% average undergraduate enrollment over 2003–2011. 
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Three-year cohort default rates are available beginning with the 2005 cohort and will replace 
two-year rates starting with the 2012 cohort. Notably, trial three-year cohort default rates for the 
2005–2008 cohorts were first created and published in 2011, so they were less subject to 
manipulation. Tables 6 and 7 replicate Tables 4 and 5 respectively, using three-year default rates. 
Direct Loan participation reduces default by 24% at high-baseline-default LT4-year for-profit 
schools.28 There is no statistical difference along the enrollment margin among these high-
default schools. This is consistent with suggestions that larger schools may simply have delayed 
default for their students until just past the two-year cohort default rate measurement window, 
although these estimates are imprecise.  
Finally, because the variation in school switching is quite different in the two time periods, I re-
estimate Equation (5) separately for the high-default, low-enrollment LT4-year for-profit schools 
in the cohorts 2003–2007 and 2007–2011. While the point estimates are larger in the later period, 
the differences are not statistically different from each other.29 
Estimated impacts of Direct Loan participation are concentrated in a subset of schools: namely, 
one-year and two-year for-profit schools with high baseline default rates and relatively low 
enrollment. I ran a series of internal validity tests on this sample of schools and describe the 
results here, while the details of the tests are in Appendix C. 
First, I re-estimated Equation (5) on this sample but include school-specific time trends. Both the 
standard errors and magnitudes increase, but the results hold—suggesting that the reduction in 
default rates is not due to linear time trends.   
                                                          
28 The estimated reduction is 7% at low default schools, which is not statistically significant. The 4.3 percentage 
point gap between the two estimated impacts (high and low default schools) is significant (p < 0.01). 
29 Results are available, but not displayed here. 
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Next, I estimated the impact of program participation in an event study framework. Importantly, 
this framework requires program switching to go in one direction, so I separately studied the 
impact of switching into the Guarantee program during the voluntary switching period, as well as 
the impact of switching into the Direct program during the involuntary switching period. This 
split sharply reduces power, and so estimates are quite imprecise. Results from the event study 
suggest that the distributed lag model may understate the impact of Direct Loan participation in 
the voluntary switching period and overstate impacts in the involuntary period, but are likely a 
wash when combined.  
Finally, as a check on whether changes in unobserved student characteristics may be related to 
Direct Loan participation, I tested whether Direct Loan participation predicts changes in 
observed characteristics. Specifically, I simultaneously re-estimated Equation (5), replacing the 
dependent variable with eight time-varying characteristics of the student population within 
schools, using a multiple-equation regression model.30 Among these eight characteristics, 
program participation is not significant at the five percent level for any of them.  At the ten 
percent level, Direct Loan participation predicts lower graduation rates and a smaller fraction of 
loans disbursed are subsidized. Because degree attainment is an important predictor of default, 
the former relationship likely understates the estimated impact of Direct Loan participation on 
default rates.31 
  
                                                          
30 Variables chosen to minimize missing observations and to represent a breadth of characteristics. 
31 The latter relationship could be a result of either relatively fewer low-income students taking out loans, or due to 
increases in the use of unsubsidized loans. Note that unsubsidized loan limits increased in 2009; increased 
unsubsidized loans and constant subsidized loan use results in a reduced fraction of subsidized loans disbursed. 
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Section 6 Student-Level Model 
The Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS) surveys follow nationally representative samples 
of first-time postsecondary students in 1995–96 and 2003–04.32 In addition to a rich set of 
student, school, and family characteristics, the BPS matches students to the National Student 
Loan Data Systems (NSLDS), which provides a snapshot of the loan balance, repayment status, 
and whether the loan is being serviced in the Direct or Guarantee program. A refreshed loan 
status as of August 2011 is forthcoming, but not available at this time.  
The BPS 1996 and 2004 surveys track 9,130 and 15,160 students starting college. 33 The analysis 
sample consists of those students (a) who were surveyed in both the initial and follow-up 
periods, (b) who are not foreign born, (c) who have not attended graduate school, and (d) who 
have been out of college for at least two years when the student loan repayment status was 
extracted in August 2001 and August 2009.  
The latter restriction (d) was chosen to give students a non-trivial opportunity to default. It takes 
at least fifteen months for students to default following enrollment. This includes the six-month 
grace period and the 270 days past-due in order to default. The lender has an additional ninety 
days in which to submit claims, which could increase the time period from enrollment to default 
to eighteen months—even if the borrower never made a single payment.34 
By construction, students who take five or more years to graduate will not have enough time to 
default within the time frame of the survey. In light of this—as well as results from the aggregate 
                                                          
32 Ninety-one percent of the sample population was successfully located in the BPS 2004/09, and of these, 90% at 
least partially completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 82%. 
33 Unweighted counts rounded to the nearest 10, as required. 
34 As an alternative, I extended the sample to include all students who would have entered repayment within the 
2008 (2000) repayment cohort window in the 2004 (1996) BPS. For the most part, this adds students who were last 
enrolled in December 2008 (2000). Results are virtually identical. 
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model suggesting that there is no discernible impact of Direct Loan participation on students at 
four-year schools—I removed students at four-year schools from the analysis sample, and 
focused on students at one-year and two-year institutions.  This leaves me with 710 students 
from the 1996 survey and 1,780 students from the 2004 survey, all from 780 unique one-year and 
two-year schools. Approximately 50% of the remaining one-year and two-year schools are in the 
for-profit sector.35 
A more technical description of the student-level sample can be found in Appendix D. This 
includes statistics describing the analysis sample, assignment of students to a single “main” 
school, and program participation within schools during the sample period. 
I estimate the causal impact of exposure to the Direct Loan program using a student-level model, 
which builds slightly on Equation (3). In order to increase power, and because there is no 
measurement error in program assignment, I combined one- and two-year schools and estimated 
(6) 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑦𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐷ℎ𝑖 +  𝛿𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑖 + 𝛾𝑆𝐷ℎ𝑠𝑐 + 𝜃𝑐𝑐 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖, 
where 𝑦𝑖 is an indicator for the repayment status of student i. For one series of specifications, this 
includes whether any of a student’s loans (i) have ever been in default or (ii) are currently in 
forbearance. The data do not allow identification of loans previously in forbearance but now in 
good standing. For students with multiple loans, the outcomes separately denote whether at least 
one of the loans is in default or forbearance.36 There is one observation per student. 
The predictors of interest  𝑂𝑂𝑙𝑦𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖 and 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐷ℎ𝑖 are mutually exclusive indicators for 
students having only Direct Loans, or students with both Direct and Guarantee Loans, 
                                                          
35 Unweighted counts rounded to the nearest 10 as required. 
36 Results are similar when using a mutually exclusive set of outcomes. 
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respectively. The excluded category is students with only Guarantee loans. Students could have 
both types of loans if they attended multiple schools, or if the school they attended switched 
programs while enrolled. Transfer students are controlled for in one specification and excluded 
in another for sensitivity analysis. Results are similar in both instances. The coefficient of 
interest 𝛽1 represents the estimated impact on the outcome if a borrower switched from having 
only Guarantee loans to having only Direct loans. The estimated coefficient 𝛽2 represents the 
impact of “split servicing.”37   
The vector 𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑐 consists of individual student characteristics, and 𝑆𝐷ℎ𝑠𝑐 is a vector of time-
varying school characteristics.  The full list of controls is detailed in Appendix D. 
School fixed effects 𝜇𝑠 account for time-invariant unobserved school heterogeneity, as in the 
school-level model. For students attending multiple schools, each student is assigned to a single    
“main school” based on the series of decision rules also described in Appendix D.  
BPS sector-x-cohort fixed effects 𝜃𝑐𝑐 capture unobserved heterogeneity across years. Cohort 
fixed effects in the aggregate model link students who exit school in the same year, but link 
students who begin school in the same year in the student-level model. For sensitivity analysis, I 
assigned students to cohorts based on their last enrollment date. Results are virtually identical. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level. 
Section 7 Student-Level Model Results 
Table 8 displays the estimated impacts of exposure to the Direct Loan program on the 
conditional probability of student default (top panel) and the use of forbearance (lower panel) for 
                                                          
37 So-called split servicing is currently a contentious issue. ED recently removed defaults from the cohort default 
rates for students with both loan types, citing “difficulties” students face in this situation (Baker, 2014). 
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students in LT4-year schools. Coefficients predicting default use and forbearance use were 
estimated separately. Students may have multiple loans, so the outcomes are not mutually 
exclusive.38  
Each of the five columns represents a specification with additional covariates. The first column 
includes only the program participation variables, and school and sector-x-survey year fixed 
effects. The second column adds variables characterizing the student loans. Column 3 adds 
individual student-level characteristics, Column 4 adds institution characteristics, and Column 5 
adds indicators for the student’s experience while in college—such as major, and degree 
attainment.39  
Table 8 suggests that having only Direct Loans increases the likelihood of having a loan in 
forbearance by 89%, with a corresponding drop in default rates of nearly two-thirds the 
magnitude. Having both types of loans meaningfully increases the use of both default and 
forbearance, and reflects the recent concerns that students with split servicing are facing 
repayment difficulties. 
Table 9 supports the aggregate-model results on heterogeneous treatment effects by sector. 
Specifically, the reduction in default rates is driven by the for-profit sector for students with only 
Direct Loans. Students with split servicing continue to see increases in default rates across 
sectors. Splitting the LT4-year for-profit sector into high/low baseline default rate schools leads 
to a sharp drop in power. The standard errors are quite large, and there is no statistically 
significant difference in estimates at the high/low baseline default schools within the sector. As a 
result, I limited the analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects to the sector level. 
                                                          
38 Results using mutually exclusive outcomes tell the same story. 
39 Described in more detail in Appendix D, section entitled “building up the model.” 
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Because the BPS has only time-invariant outcomes for each student, I was unable to estimate 
linear time trends or use an event study analysis (as I do in the aggregate model). As a test for 
whether changes in unobserved characteristics may be correlated with changes in Direct Loan 
participation over time, I re-estimated equation (6) in a multiple-equation regression model, 
selecting eleven student-level characteristics with relatively few missing observations as 
dependent variables. Students with only Direct Loans correlated with increased rates of their 
having parents with at least a BA, and decreased rates of the student having a GED, although it is 
not a statistically significant predictor of the other nine variables. This suggests a correlation 
between more advantaged borrowers and Direct Loan use within this limited sample, which 
could overstate the results if there are other, unobserved, changing characteristics unrelated to 
the controls operating in the same direction.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Section 8 Conclusions 
Broadly, this study suggests that lender incentives and moral hazard can impact borrower 
repayment patterns. Policymakers concerned with student loan default, home foreclosures, and 
auto repossessions may be able to reduce these rates by reducing the net value to lenders of these 
outcomes. For example, requiring mortgage servicers to verify loan ownership and borrower 
missed payments—instead of “robo-signing” foreclosure documents—could lead to lower rates 
of foreclosure. This may be a cheaper intervention than subsidizing principal reductions, or 
encouraging other loan modifications. 
More narrowly, this study provides evidence that participation in the Direct Loan program 
reduces cohort default rates at one- and two-year for-profit schools. The student-level analysis 
provides evidence of a mechanism: Students are more likely to use forbearance in order to avoid 
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default in the Direct Loan program relative to the Guarantee program. The impacts are driven by 
schools with students who have been the least likely to repay their loans on time and the most 
likely to enter default relative to forbearance, providing support for my hypothesis that borrowers 
in the Direct Loan program will be subjected to more default prevention interventions. Subject to 
data availability, future research into the relationship between lender incentives and the use of 
income-based repayment plans, instead of forbearance, would make a worthwhile endeavor. 
From a student loan policy perspective, this study suggests that the Direct Loan program may be 
better for struggling borrowers than the Guarantee program. Combined with reports suggesting 
that the Direct Loan program is cheaper for taxpayers under a broad range of assumptions (Lucas 
& Moore, 2009) and that forbearance use reduces the likelihood of entering default (Price, 2001), 
this study suggests that federal student loan programs should not return to a Guarantee system 
without meaningful modifications, particularly to the high guarantee rate. 
The Guarantee program is no longer available today, but the current administration of the Direct 
Loan program is unlikely to be optimal. Indeed, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury recently 
questioned the effectiveness of student loan servicing in the Direct Loan program, asking why 
seven million borrowers were in default on federal loans when they could be enrolled in income-
based repayments, or obtaining loan modifications (Raskin, 2014). 
Recent research suggests that financial incentives in the Direct Loan program are still not strong 
enough to entice servicers to provide more than the minimum required effort to communicate 
with borrowers and keep them out of default (Fink & Zullo, 2014), although servicer 
communication in the Direct Loan program is higher than in the Guarantee program. The results 
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of this study suggest that further aligning the incentives of student loan servicers with borrower 
repayment—or raising their minimum required effort—should continue to reduce default rates.  
Providing information to struggling borrowers may not be so easy. While private lenders are 
required to make regular attempts to contact borrowers prior to default, surveys suggest that few 
borrowers recall such contact. One area of promise might be to provide information at the time 
of loan signing and again when exiting school, and then require borrowers to make an active 
decision on their choice of loan repayment plan. 
The default repayment plan for student loan borrowers is a ten-year fixed-rate amortization, 
although borrowers are eligible for alternative repayment plans which could reduce required 
monthly payments in exchange for a longer term. Borrowers with steeper earnings profiles may 
be better off in alternatives such as the graduated or income-based repayment plan. Yet, research 
suggests that default plans are often sticky, even when suboptimal (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & 
Metrick, 2004). 
Given this, policymakers may be able to improve federal student loan programs and reduce 
default rates by providing information to borrowers about their repayment options prior to 
entering repayment, and then ask borrowers to make an active decision about which repayment 
plan to choose. Further, the loan program can make it easier for struggling borrowers to enroll in 
forbearance. For example, borrowers who are receiving unemployment benefits could 
automatically be enrolled in forbearance, but left with the option to continue making payments in 
order to reduce the payment of lifetime interest.  
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Figure I.1.  Dollar-Weighted Fraction of New Federal Student Loans Originated through the Guarantee Program 
each Academic Year. Spring-semester years are displayed on the x-axis.  E.g. 2002 represents the 2001-02 
academic year.
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Guarantee
Only
Direct
Only Switch
Unique Schools 267 1,068 3,239
School-x-Year Observations 1,610 8,407 36,087
Avg Annual Loan Recipients 1,005 3,537 2,912
Average Annual Default Rate 9.0 7.2 6.9
Avg Freshman Loan Amount 4,786 4,663 4,725
Pct Years Direct Only 0.00 0.95 0.14
Pct Years Guarantee Only 0.95 0.00 0.82
Pct Years Mixed Programs 0.03 0.06 0.05
Four-Year Public Schools 0.02 0.24 0.14
Four-Year Private Schools 0.12 0.15 0.33
Four-Year For-Profit Schools 0.04 0.03 0.05
Two-Year Public Schools 0.22 0.10 0.22
Two-Year For-Profit Schools 0.26 0.15 0.12
One-Year For-Profit Schools 0.21 0.31 0.10
Other Sector 0.13 0.02 0.06
Undergrad Enrollment 1,825 5,401 4,950
Pct Female 0.64 0.69 0.63
Pct Asian 0.04 0.04 0.04
Pct Black 0.21 0.18 0.14
Pct Hispanic 0.12 0.12 0.09
Pct Independent 0.64 0.45 0.44
Table I.1.  Characteristics of Schools by Program Participation: 2000-2011.
Notes:  Schools are assigned to the Direct or Guarantee program if at least 90% of loans within a year are 
disbursed through that program.  A school is defined as  a Switch school if it is assigned as a participant in 
each program for at least one year during the period.  Guarantee Only schools must not have offered federal 
loans in 2011. Five schools (not shown) have one observation only and have mixed program participation.
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Less-than-Four-Year
Schools
Four-Year Schools
 Sector * Year + School Fixed Effects -1.459*** -0.668**
(0.401) (0.322)
 + Time-Varying School Characteristics -1.065*** -0.220
(0.392) (0.297)
Average Default Rate: 2003-2011 9.1 4.5
Observations 18,639 16,826
R-Squared 0.679 0.835
Notes:  Each estimate is from a separate regression estimating equation (1) on 2-year cohort default rates.  
Standard errors are clustered at the school level and displayed in parentheses.  Average default rate 
displayed is among Guarantee program schools.  R-squared and observations are from second 
specification.  * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** 
Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table I.2.  Estimated Impact of School Participation in the Direct Loan Program on Cohort 
Default Rates for Repayment Cohorts 2003-2011.
35
Fraction Loans in 
Default or 
Forbearance
Default Share of 
Loans in Default or 
Forbearance
Four-Year Public Schools 19% 25%
Four-Year Private Schools 13% 27%
Four-Year For-Profit Schools 25% 44%
Two-Year Public Schools 32% 44%
Two-Year For-Profit Schools 34% 66%
One-Year For-Profit Schools 40% 58%
Notes:  Student Loan program participation based on originating source for loans in 2003-
04 only.  Fraction loans in default or forbearance is a share of loans ever reaching 
repayment, including paid in full, deferment or forbearance, and default.  The numerator 
includes those in deferment, forbearance, and default.
Table I.3. Federal Student Loan Repayment Status in 2009 among 
Borrowers with Guarantee Program Loans.
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Below Median 
Default Rate
Above Median 
Default Rate
Less-than-Four-Year Public Schools Coefficient -0.347 0.206
Standard Error (0.771) (0.777)
Unique Schools 423 394
Mean Borrowers 706 658
Mean Default Rate 8.1 11.3
Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -0.270 -3.026***
Standard Error (0.608) (0.842)
Unique Schools 830 712
Mean Borrowers 331 432
Mean Default Rate 7.0 11.9
Table I.4.  Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation by Baseline Default Rates.
Notes:  Unique schools and mean borrowers are unweighted over the sample period within group.  Each specification 
is estimated separately by sector.  Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% default rates by their earliest default rate 
in the sample.  Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group indicators, and 
estimates presented are the sum of lag terms.  Sectors displayed have at least 200 unique schools in the sample.   
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at 
the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Below Median 
Default Rate
Above Median 
Default Rate
Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -3.303** 0.294
Standard Error (1.407) (0.953)
Unique Schools 358 358
Mean Borrowers 111 682
Mean Default Rate 11.2 12.3
Table I.5.  Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation by Average Undergraduate Enrollment Size 
among High Default Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools.
Notes:  Each specification is estimated separately by sector.  Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% by average enrollment over 
the period.  Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group indicators, and estimates presented are 
the sum of the lag terms. The sample includes for-profit schools in the top 50% baseline default rate only. Standard errors are 
clustered at the school level and displayed in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at 
the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Low 50% 
Default Rate
High 50% 
Default Rate
Less-than-Four-Year Public Schools Coefficient -1.114 0.839
Standard Error (1.044) (1.218)
Unique Schools 423 394
Mean Borrowers 706 658
Mean Default Rate 14.4 18.6
Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -1.272 -5.562***
Standard Error (0.970) (1.376)
Unique Schools 830 712
Mean Borrowers 331 432
Mean Default Rate 16.4 23.7
Table I.6.  Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation on Three-Year Cohort Default 
Rates by Baseline Default Rates.
Notes:  Unique schools and mean borrowers are unweighted means over the sample period within group.  Each 
specification is estimated separately by sector.  Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% default rates by their 
earliest default rate in the sample.  Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group 
indicators, and estimates presented are the sum of the coefficients on the lag terms.  Sectors displayed have at least 
200 unique schools in the sample.   Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 
10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Low 50% 
Enrollment
High 50% 
Enrollment
Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools Coefficient -5.303** -2.509
Standard Error (2.572) (1.661)
Unique Schools 332 331
Mean Borrowers 117 730
Mean Default Rate 20.8 25.4
Table I.7.  Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation on Three-Year Cohort Default 
Rates among High-Default Less-than-Four-Year For-Profit Schools.
Notes:  Unique schools and mean borrowers are unweighted means from 2005-2011 within each group.  Each 
specification is estimated separately by sector.  Schools are assigned to top/bottom 50% default rates by their 
earliest default rate in the sample.  Heterogeneous impacts are estimated by fully interacting lag terms with group 
indicators, and estimates presented are the sum of the coefficients on the lag terms.  Sectors displayed have at least 
200 unique schools in the sample.   Standard errors are displayed in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at 
the 1% level.
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Outcome Mean
Has Only Direct Loans -0.080 -0.126** -0.095* -0.077 -0.062 0.27
(0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057)
Has Both Direct and Guarantee Loans 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.206*** 0.219*** 0.211***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.053)
Has Only Direct Loans 0.092** 0.087** 0.084** 0.111** 0.098** 0.11
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Has Both Direct and Guarantee Loans 0.151*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 0.107*** 0.101**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 2488 2488 2488 2385 2385
R-squared 0.487 0.516 0.570 0.575 0.589
School + Cohort Fixed Effects X X X X X
+Loan-specific variables X X X X
+Student Characteristics X X X
+Institution Characteristics X X
+Educational Experience X
Outcome is Any Loans in Default
Outcome is Any Loans in Forbearance
Notes:  Coefficients were estimated separately for each of the two outcomes. Each observation uses the survey weight associated with being observed in 
both the initial interview and final follow-up period. R-squared estimates are for Default specifications.  Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.  
Outcome mean represents fraction in default or forbearance among Guarantee loan borrowers. 
* Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table I.8.  Linear Probability Model Separately Predicting Default and Forbearance.  Stacked 1996 and 2004 BPS Surveys.  
Less-than-Four-Year Institutions Only.
41
Table I.9.  Heterogeneous Impacts of Direct Loan Participation by Sector.
Any Default
Any 
Forbearance Any Default
Any 
Forbearance
Has Only Direct Loans 0.066 0.076 -0.201* 0.095
(0.075) (0.067) (0.104) (0.076)
Has Both Direct and Guarantee Loans 0.199** 0.035 0.246*** 0.148***
(0.083) (0.074) (0.078) (0.057)
Observations 899 899 1221 1221
R-squared 0.788 0.680 0.529 0.438
Less-than-Four-Year
Public Schools
Less-than-Four-Year 
For-Profit Schools
Notes : Each observation uses the survey weight associated with being observed in both the initial interview and final 
follow-up period.  Standard errors are displayed in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** 
Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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CHAPTER II 
Estimating the Causal Impact of the CARD Act on Credit Card Ownership among Young 
Borrowers 
 
Section 1 Introduction 
The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act, or the 
Act) was enacted in order to “establish fair and transparent practices related to the extension of 
credit” (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013). One of the four key provisions of the Act 
was to restrict credit access among individuals under the age of 21, unless they could prove an 
independent ability to repay debt. The provision was passed in part due to misleading reports that 
college students were amassing excessive credit card debt (Hawkins, 2012).  
Restricting credit access among young adults may have good or bad long-term consequences. 
For example, if young borrowers are myopic or have low financial literacy, they may incur large 
debt burdens before understanding how to make optimal financial decisions. Restricting access 
to credit could help ensure that these borrowers are not overburdened with debt before 
understanding the long-term costs of paying for consumption on credit.  
However, responsible card holders may begin building a credit history while young, which could 
positively affect interest rates and access to auto or home mortgage debt products later in life. 
Having a “thin file” (lacking a credit history necessary for accurate credit scoring) is one of the 
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most important negative predictors of homeownership, even while controlling for credit 
impairments and income constraints (Calem, Firestone, & Wachter, 2010). Moreover, customers 
without a credit history are routinely denied access to traditional forms of credit (Cheney, 2008) 
and may shift into inferior substitutes (Zinman, 2010). 
Four years after the enactment of the CARD Act, the impact of this provision on the access of 
young adults to credit is not clear. First, if credit card companies already required that 
individuals to be able to independently repay debt, then the Act’s age restrictions would be 
redundant and would not affect credit access. However, anecdotes suggest that lenders actively 
targeted college students in the pre-Act period. Many incoming undergraduates would have very 
little personal income, suggesting that income requirements were likely uncommon. 
In addition, surveys have suggested that (a) credit card companies still market products to 
students, (b) having an independent ability to pay debt is not always verified, and (c) in some 
cases, student loans are being used to demonstrate income (Hawkins, 2012). These loopholes 
suggest that savvy consumers are able to bypass the Act’s restrictions, which could lead to 
heterogeneous treatment effects across certain segments of the population. 
A Consumer Financial Protection Bureau report displays a reduction in new credit card 
ownership among 21-year-olds after passage of the Act, but new card ownership among this 
group had been steadily declining since 2007, and then began rising (slowly) since 2010 
(Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013). The descriptive statistics are unable to 
distinguish the impact of the Act on card ownership from general economic effects.  
One recent working paper uses a difference-in-differences model to control for changes in the 
economy, and estimates an 8 percentage point (15%) decline in card ownership among 20-year-
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olds due to the Act (Debaut, Ghent, & Kudlyak, 2014).1 This estimate is based on a sample that 
may not be representative of the majority of affected individuals, which I discuss in more detail 
later in this paper.  
This study asks two questions. (a) How much do the age restrictions of the CARD Act reduce 
credit card ownership among individuals affected by the Act?  (b) How do the impacts of the law 
vary across different segments of the population? Individuals affected by the CARD Act are still 
under age 25 by the end of 2014. As these cohorts age, this study will serve as a stepping stone to 
estimate the impact of reducing credit card access on longer-term outcomes: for example, credit 
scores, delinquency rates, and prices faced in other debt markets. 
Identification is complicated by the financial crash of 2008–2009, which saw a sharp reduction 
in credit card ownership among young adults who would eventually be affected by the Act. In 
order to disentangle the effects of the recession from the Act on card ownership, I control for the 
unemployment rate and other economic conditions that individuals faced at each age in which 
they were most likely to obtain a credit card for the first time. I provide evidence that there exists 
a similar pre-trend in credit card ownership between young adults aged 21–24, and those aged 
18–20, once these economic conditions are accounted for.  
With little evidence of a violation in the parallel trends assumption, I identify the impacts of the 
Act on card ownership by estimating a difference-in-differences model. I compare the fraction of 
individuals with a credit card within public-use micro areas (pumas) among affected versus 
unaffected cohorts, before and after the Act’s enactment.2 In order to deal with potential 
anticipation effects in the nine months between the announcement and effective date, I re-
                                                 
1 Relative to 22-year-olds from December 2008 to December 2010. 
2 A description of pumas may be found on the Census website: https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/puma.html 
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estimate the model and drop the year 2009 from the sample. The estimated impact on card 
ownership is even greater, suggesting that anticipatory responses to the Act may not be 
meaningfully present among this population. 
I find evidence that the Act reduces credit card ownership among young adults, and that the 
effect of the Act lingers even after individuals turn 21 years of age. Specifically, the Act reduces 
credit card ownership by 39%— from 11.3% to 6.8%— among individuals 18–20 years old. 
Further, individuals who had been affected by the Act still observe a 22% reduction in credit 
card ownership—from 24.6% to 19.1%—even after turning 21 years old, when the age 
restrictions are no longer binding. Estimated effects are greatest among cohorts who were the 
youngest (specifically, under age 18) when the Act was first passed. The effects of the Act are 
greater in pumas with a relatively high concentration of low-income households. 
Broadly, this study contributes to a literature discussing the impact of restricting credit access. 
More narrowly, this study is one of a number of studies to estimate the impact of various 
components of the CARD Act. To my knowledge, this is the second paper attempting to quantify 
the effect of the Act’s age restrictions, and the first to estimate this impact over the entire 
population of affected consumers. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background detail on the CARD 
Act. Section 3 discusses the contribution of this study to the literature. Section 4 describes the 
data and sample, while section 5 discusses the identification strategy and empirical methods. 
Section 6 discusses the results, and the paper concludes in section 7. 
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Section 2 Background on the CARD Act 
The House of Representatives began work on passing a “Bill of Rights” for credit card holders in 
early 2008. The bill, titled the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act, 
eventually passed both the House and Senate and was signed into law on May 22, 2009. Most 
provisions, including the age-based restrictions, went into effect nine months later on February 
22, 2010. 
The CARD Act has four key components: Consumer Protections, Enhanced Consumer 
Disclosures, Protection of Young Consumers, and Gift Cards. Consumer Protections establishes 
limits on penalties, fees, and interest rate increases, and requires a 45-day advance notice of 
interest rate increases. The Enhanced Consumer Disclosures provision provides consumers with 
explicit calculation of the additional costs of paying only the minimum payment each period, as 
well as disclosing late payment deadlines and penalties related to missing payments. The Gift 
Cards component removes dormancy, inactivity, and service fees from gift cards, and restricts 
expiration dates.3 
The Protection of Young Consumers component is the focus of this study. Within this 
component, there are five subcomponents, the first of which is the most relevant. First, credit 
card companies are prohibited from issuing a credit card to individuals under 21 years of age, 
unless that individual meets one of two exceptions: (a) the applicant has an over-21 cosigner,4 or 
(b) the applicant submits an application with proof of an independent ability to repay debt 
obligations resulting from the extension of credit. Second, this component restricts under-21 
                                                 
3 The full law can be found here: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr627enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr627enr.pdf. 
4 Explicit guidance confirms that this does not mean family members or guardians only. Any individual 21 years or 
older may act as a cosigner. 
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consumers from receiving pre-screened credit offers. Third, parental approval is required for any 
increases in credit limits for co-signed cards where the parent is jointly liable.5  
The final subcomponents are specific to college students. The fourth subcomponent requires 
colleges to disclose the terms of any agreements with credit card companies, and prohibits credit 
card companies from offering tangible gifts to induce applications for credit on college 
campuses. Finally, the fifth subcomponent requires creditors to submit reports to regulators on 
all terms and agreements of college affinity cards.  
Section 3 Contribution to the Literature 
Broadly, this study contributes to a literature discussing the effectiveness of financial regulation 
and the impact of restricting credit access. Restricting credit access should have meaningfully 
heterogeneous treatment affects across the population. Some individuals may be made worse off 
without access to credit. For example, Zinman (2010) found that regulations on payday lending 
reduces access to payday lending, but may have shifted consumers to inferior products such as 
the use of overdraft on checking accounts.  Moreover, consumers use credit cards as a standard 
way to smooth consumption (e.g., Dey, 2005), so restricting access to credit could lead to 
reduced lifetime utility.  
Other consumers may be made better off without access to credit cards. Specifically, some 
consumers may be myopic or lack the cognitive ability to optimize among their financial options, 
and learning from past mistakes or from others may be difficult (Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, & 
Tufano, 2011). In these circumstances, financial regulation may improve lifetime welfare. 
                                                 
5 This same restriction holds for whoever is the cosigner. The term “parent” is emphasized in the law. 
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A few studies have used the recent implementation of the CARD Act to measure the impact of 
regulating the credit card industry. Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Mahoney, and Stroebel (2013) 
analyzed two components of the CARD Act. The study found that a regulation limiting the fees 
banks may charge customers reduces total fees consumers faced by more than 20%, with the 
largest treatment effects among the highest credit-risk consumers. In addition, the study found 
that disclosing to consumers the cost of paying the minimum monthly payment led to a small, 
but statistically significant, increase in repayment rates. Finally, the study found that these 
impacts exist with no evidence of rising interest rates or reduced credit limits. 
Jambulapati and Stavins (2014) tested whether the CARD Act regulations led credit card issuers 
to close unprofitable accounts. They found some evidence in Equifax data of an increase in 
account closures after the Federal Reserve Board adopted the initial regulatory rules, but not 
after the Act became effective. However, evidence from the Consumer Finance Monthly surveys 
suggests that the bulk of closures were initiated from the consumer and not the card issuer, 
consistent with the Agarwal et al. (2013) finding that the Act did not meaningfully reduce credit 
access. 
This study estimates the impact of another component of the CARD Act: restricting credit card 
access to young adults. To my knowledge, just two papers have evaluated this component. First, 
Hawkins (2012) surveys approximately 500 students (not randomly) in post-CARD years at the 
University of Houston and Baylor University, with a response rate of nearly 90%. He uncovered 
evidence that students have continued to be marketed by credit card companies, that under-21 
students have been able to access credit, and that some students have been able to easily bypass 
the income requirements by reporting student loans as independent income.  
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In addition, Hawkins stressed that the reports most typically cited as evidence of rising debt 
levels among students in Congressional arguments for the law are misleading. Specifically, the 
Sallie Mae and Nellie Mae series of studies draw from a population of students who have applied 
for private student loans (e.g., Sallie Mae, 2009). While Sallie Mae (2009) reports credit card 
ownership among undergraduates as high as 84% in April 2008, I find that credit card ownership 
among 18–21-year-olds prior to the Act is less than 25%.6 
The age restrictions of the CARD Act were included in the law due to concerns that college-age 
young adults are unable to make optimal financial decisions regarding credit card debt. Debaut et 
al. (2014) challenged this assumption and, using the CARD Act to provide exogenous variation 
for age of entry into the credit markets, found evidence that borrowers who obtain a credit card at 
a young age (under 21) are no more likely to have serious credit delinquencies than those 
borrowers who first obtain a credit card at age 21.  
As a first stage to test the impact of the law, the study found that the age restrictions of the Act 
reduce credit access among affected individuals by 8 percentage points (15%). However, the 
sample comprising this estimate may not be representative of the population of affected 
consumers. 
Specifically, the study used the Equifax/Consumer Credit Panel, which tracks a 5% random 
sample of individuals with entry and exit since 1999, and is updated quarterly.7 In order to exist 
in the Equifax universe, an individual must have a credit history. Individuals obtain a credit 
history when lenders report the repayment status of debt to credit bureaus. Credit card debt and 
                                                 
6 Author’s calculations using the Equifax/Consumer Credit Panel. This is a sample of all individuals and not just 
college students, who may be more likely to hold credit cards. 
7 The CCP also tracks debt at the household level, linking all individuals who live at the same address as those who 
make the initial 5% sample. This study, and Debaut et al., use the base sample to avoid using students who are 
considered in the same “household” but in reality just share a dormitory address. 
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installment loans are reported, but items such as utility bills, cable or cell phone bills, and rent 
are not reported, and therefore do not initiate credit histories with Equifax.  
Thus, the population from which the sample is drawn is endogenous to the CARD Act itself: 
Individuals affected by the Act may not have a credit history and will not show up in the data. A 
standard difference-in-difference model which does not account for sample endogeneity would 
fail to consider the affected individuals who do not have a credit history in the post-Act period, 
which would lead to upwardly biased estimates. The authors accounted for this issue by 
comparing relative changes in credit card ownership among 20-year-olds versus 22-year-olds in 
2008 and 2010, conditional on having a credit history by age 18 (thus, prior to the Act being 
announced).8 
The impact of the CARD Act on this sample is likely to meaningfully differ from the average 
impact on the affected population for a number of reasons. First, it ignores the impact on 
individuals who were 19 years of age or younger in 2010, focusing instead on a single cohort of 
individuals of age 20, as of Dec 31, 2010. However, in the pre-Act period, many individuals who 
desired a credit card already obtained one by age 20, therefore reducing the impact of the law on 
this cohort.9  
In addition, the restriction of having a credit history by age 18 has two implications. First, this 
reduces the sample of 20- and 22-year-olds within the Equifax universe by nearly 70%. Second, 
it ensures that all members of the sample had a credit history prior to the Act, making sample 
members even more likely to have already had a credit card in their own name prior to the Act. 
All of this leads to a sample where, for example, 53% of their 20-year-olds in 2008 have a credit 
                                                 
8 The authors excluded the year 2009 due to concerns that affected borrowers responded to the law by obtaining 
credit in the period between the announcement and the effective date. 
9 See Figure 1, discussed in detail below. 
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card, which compares to my estimate of just 27% of the population of 20-year-olds in 2008 
having a credit card. 
This study builds on Debaut et al. (2014) to provide a more complete estimate of the impact of 
the CARD Act’s age restrictions on credit card ownership. First, I combine the Equifax data with 
population data from the U.S. Census. This allows for estimates that represent the impact on card 
ownership for cohorts of each individual age within the entire U.S., instead of those with a prior 
credit history. Second, I demonstrate that I can satisfy the parallel trends condition necessary to 
produce unbiased estimates in a difference-in-differences model, once I control for the statewide 
economic conditions that individuals faced at each age where they are most likely to first obtain 
credit (ages 18–21). I then estimate heterogeneous treatment effects based on the age when first 
affected by the Act, as well as across demographic characteristics (e.g., the fraction of low-
income households) of the puma.  
Section 4 Data and Sample 
Observations are at the age-year-puma level. The sample includes individuals aged 18–24 in 
each year from 2006 through 2013. The outcome of interest is the fraction of individuals within 
an age-year-puma that have a credit card in their own name, and controls include the annual 
statewide economic conditions that cohorts faced at each age. 
Individual-level credit card ownership data comes from the Equifax Consumer Credit Panel 
(CCP) under the management of the Federal Reserve System.10 Individuals are assigned to 
census tracts based on the addresses reported with the credit accounts. For college students, it is 
                                                 
10 This data is detailed in Lee and van der Klaauw (2010). 
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possible that some may use their school addresses while other students use their permanent 
family address.11 Both age and credit ownership are determined as of December 31 each year. 
I’ve been granted access to the CCP, aggregated to the age-year-puma level for 18–24-year-olds 
from 2006–2013. The denominator of interest is the annual population count within an age-year-
puma, which is generated from publicly available population estimates provided by the U.S. 
Census Bureau.12 The Census only provides population counts for five-year age buckets at the 
county level in non-Census years (e.g., the number of individuals between the ages of 16 and 20 
in county X in the year 2009).13 I combine population counts by individual age from the 2010 
Census with these five-year age buckets, along with a county-to-puma mapping, to estimate the 
population counts of each individual age in all years within each puma. This is detailed in 
Appendix A.   
I use three economic measures to control for the economic conditions and the lending 
environment faced by each cohort. These include annual statewide unemployment rates and 
gross domestic product, which are publicly available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 
addition, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York publishes annual per-capita outstanding 
mortgage balances for each state, which I use as a control for the lending environment within the 
state. From these data, I calculate annual statewide growth rates of per-capital mortgage balances 
and GDP. 
                                                 
11 To address this possibility, I re-estimate the models at the state level instead of the puma level, and the results are 
comparable. 
12 College students are assigned to the address at which they spend the most time residing for both the Census and 
American Community Survey: http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_rules.html 
(Census) and https://askacs.census.gov/faq.php?id=5000&faqId=915 (ACS). 
13 Intercensal estimates at each individual age are available at the state and national level, but not at a geography 
smaller than the state. I requested this from Census and was turned down. 
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Individuals affected by the Act may still obtain credit by demonstrating sufficient income to 
repay debt. College students may be limited by income constraints while in school; however, 
they may also have the savviness to navigate the application process. I expect the Act to have 
differential effects across populations with varying income or college enrollment. I obtain time-
invariant puma-level statistics from the American Community Survey five-year summary files 
(2006–2010), including the fraction of households with less than $25,000 annual income and the 
proportion of 18–24-year-olds enrolled in college. These statistics are publicly available for 
download through the Data Ferret tool provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
Table 1 summarizes the relevant statistics of the sample. There are 980 pumas which have 18–
24-year-olds in the Equifax data during the sample period.14 The Equifax population—those with 
a credit history—sharply decreases from 2008–2012. This demonstrates the importance of 
controlling for sample endogeneity. From 2010–2012, the fraction of 18–24-year-olds in Equifax 
with a credit card increased from 37% to 45%, but this was due to the shrinking proportion of 
individuals with a credit history. The overall fraction of the population with a credit card was 
actually decreasing through this period from 21% to 16%. Finally, this table demonstrates the 
credit card usage of young adults in the pre-CARD period. While this data cannot differentiate 
college students, it shows that less than 30% of 18–24-year-olds had a credit card in 2008. This 
is sharply lower than the 84% of undergraduates with a credit card reported in Sallie Mae (2009).  
The economic controls reflect aggregate statewide annual measures that are not age specific. The 
table shows unemployment rates rapidly rising through 2009, peaking in 2010, and slowly falling 
over the rest of the period. Per-capita GDP growth was negative in 2008 and 2009 before 
                                                 
14 The eight pumas that drop out in 2012–2013 represent just 0.1% of the Equifax population from 2006–2011. 
There are just over 2,000 pumas in the United States. 
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returning to small, positive levels. Mortgage growth was explosive in 2006 and 2007, but has 
been negative since 2009.   
The controls demonstrate a wide variety of factors in the economy: GDP growth reflects the 
economic contractions in 2008–2009. The high unemployment rates show that the economy was 
improving since 2010, but still weak in some areas. The mortgage balances reflect weak lending 
since 2009 after incredibly loose conditions in the early years of the sample.  
Section 5 Identification and Methods 
In this section, I discuss threats to identification and concerns over measurement in the data. I 
slowly build up the model to resolve these issues.  
Table 2 displays the pattern and intensity of how cohorts have been affected by the CARD Act. 
Individuals who are under 21 years old as of February 2010 are affected by the age restrictions of 
the Act. However, these cohorts don’t remain forever restricted from obtaining credit cards. The 
red arrow displays a cohort over time as its members age. Individuals born in 1990 are 20 years 
old by year-end 2010. These individuals were first affected by the CARD Act at age 20. The 
following year, in 2011, this cohort is 21 years old. They are no longer affected by the Act, but 
they had been previously (for one year).   
The birth cohort of 1992 was 18 years of age in 2010, and so they faced the age restrictions for 
three years, from 2010–2012. In 2013, this cohort was 21 years old and no longer affected by the 
Act, but they had been affected for nearly all the years in which they would have most likely 
obtained a pre-Act credit card. This variance in treatment intensity guides my estimation 
strategy. 
55
Credit card use has fallen among young adults after the implementation of the CARD Act. Figure 
1 displays the fraction of individuals with a card in their own name, by birth cohort, as they age 
from 18 to 23. Those cohorts affected by the Act display a depression in credit card use from 
ages 18–20, with relative increases after turning 21 when the Act is no longer binding. If cohorts 
would have followed the same trajectory absent the Act, then a difference-in-differences model 
presented in Equation (1) with borrower-level data could estimate the causal impact of the Act 
on the credit card use of affected groups.15 
(1) 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻21𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖 is a binary indicator that equals one if individual i in year t has a credit card. 
The variables 𝜃𝑖 and 𝜑𝑖 represent age and year fixed effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of individual 
characteristics that could affect the likelihood of having a credit card such as family income, and 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻21𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝑖 represents being under 21 in the post-CARD Act period. Finally, 𝛽 
represents the causal impact of the Act on the likelihood that an individual has a credit card 
under the standard difference-in-differences assumptions of parallel trends, and no confounding 
treatments concurrent with the passage of the Act. Equifax data provides only the individual’s 
birth year, so age is measured each year as of December 31st.16 
Borrower-level data is restricted, although I have been granted license to use Equifax data 
aggregated to the age-puma-year level, and so I aggregate Equation (1) to this level. As shown in 
Figure 1, older individuals are much more likely to have a credit card, even before the CARD 
Act. To reflect that a five percentage point drop is a larger percentage drop for 18–19-year-olds 
                                                 
15 Below, I discuss the potential effect of individuals responding in anticipation of the passage of the Act. 
16 Individuals with birthdays late in the calendar year may be identified as unaffected by the age restrictions of the 
Act, yet were affected for much of the year. This should bias estimates toward zero, and so the true magnitude of the 
effect of the Act may be greater than estimated.  
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than for 21–22-year-olds (with a much higher baseline of credit card ownership), I model the 
natural log of the fraction of credit card ownership within an age-puma-year, as in Equation (2).  
(2) 𝐿𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻21𝑎 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝑖 + 𝜌𝑎 + 𝜃𝑎 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑖.   
Here, 𝐿𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 represents the natural log of the fraction of individuals of age a in 
puma p in year t that have a credit card in their own name.17 The variables 𝜌𝑎, 𝜃𝑎 , and 𝜑𝑖 
represent puma, age, and year fixed effects respectively, while being “treated” is represented by 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐻21𝑎 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐻𝑖 —that is, individuals between the ages of 18 and 20 in the post-CARD 
Act sample period 2010–2013. The vector 𝑋𝑎𝑎𝑖 consists of characteristics describing individuals 
of age a in puma p and year t, such as the statewide unemployment rate faced when the cohort 
was 18 years old. 
The CARD Act was passed in the wake of the 2008–09 financial crash, during which time 
lenders tightened access to credit. This tightening of credit likely had greater effects on credit 
card access among young adults who hadn’t already obtained credit. Indeed, Figure 2 shows that 
credit card ownership among 18–20-year-olds was already decreasing relative to older cohorts 
throughout 2008 and 2009. This is a violation of the parallel trends assumption needed for 
identification in a difference-in-differences framework. 
I argue that the differential effect of the recession on under-21 borrowers can be controlled for, 
using time-varying statewide economic variables. Data provided by the Board of Governors 
(Figure 3) shows that financial institutions have tightened lending standards with regard to credit 
cards during recessionary periods. Figure 1 showed that most credit card holders first receive a 
card between ages18 and 21. Putting these together suggests that the age of initial credit 
                                                 
17 Co-signed credit cards are disregarded. 
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ownership should be affected by the economic conditions present when an individual is between 
the ages of 18 and 21.  
In equation (3), I regress the natural log of the fraction of individuals with a credit card within an 
age-puma-year on age and puma fixed effects, including only the pre-CARD years 2006–2009. I 
also include a number of statewide economic variables that individuals faced at each age. I then 
calculate the average residual by year for individuals over and under the age of 21. I exclude year 
fixed effects so that I may predict out of sample from 2010–2013. 
(3) 𝐿𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜌𝑎 + 𝜃𝑎 + 𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑈𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑖.   
The variable 𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑈𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 includes the state unemployment rate, the growth rate of per-
capita GDP, and the growth rate of per-capita mortgage debt that each cohort faced at each age 
from 18 to 24, as well as interactions among the rates faced between the ages of 18 and 21.18 
Pumas do not cross state boundaries. All cohorts face the same economic condition within a state 
and year; however, the age at which they face these conditions varies. For example, California 
had a 12.35% unemployment rate in 2010. The 1990 birth cohort residing in California receives 
this value for “unemployment rate at age 20,” while the 1992 birth cohort receives this value for 
“unemployment rate at age 18.” I detail the precise main effects and interaction terms in 
Appendix A.  
Figure 4 shows that the inclusion of economic controls almost completely eliminates the pre-Act 
difference in trends among those older or under the age of 21. This is necessary to satisfy the 
identification assumptions of a difference-in-differences model.19 I then build on Equation (3) to 
                                                 
18 These age-specific values are set to zero if the cohort hasn’t reached that age by the observation year. 
19 The residuals gap between the two groups narrows in the final years of the sample. By 2013, most individuals 
between the ages of 21 and 24 had been previously affected by the CARD Act when younger. 
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estimate the causal impact of the CARD Act on the likelihood of young adults having a credit 
card in their own name.  
(4) 𝐿𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖 + 𝜌𝑎 + 𝜃𝑎 + 𝜑𝑖+ 𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑈𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑖. 
The variable 𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖 is an indicator for a cohort having ever been affected by the Act 
through year t, regardless of age in the observation year. Specifically, cohorts born in 1990 or 
later in years starting in 2010 are “Ever Affected.” Individuals born in 1990 would be no older 
than 20 years old by Dec 31, 2010 and thus no older than 20 years old in Feb 2010 when the Act 
went into effect.  
The variables 𝜌𝑎 , 𝜃𝑎 , and 𝜑𝑖 represent puma, age, and year fixed effects respectively. Standard 
errors are clustered at the birthyear · puma level to reflect that 21-year-olds in 2012 were the 
same 20-year-olds in 2011, and so on. Because credit ownership is typically maintained over 
time, cohorts with a high error term in one year are likely to have a high error term in later years. 
It is unlikely that the reduction in credit card access due to the Act when the Act is binding (i.e., 
an individual is under 21) is equal to the impact when the Act is no longer binding. Equation (5) 
separates out the effect for individuals currently and previously affected by the Act. 
(5) 𝐿𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑈𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖 +
𝜌𝑎 + 𝜃𝑎 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑈𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑖.        
The variable 𝐻𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑈𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖 takes on the value of 1 for cohorts who are under age 21 in 
year t in the post-CARD years 2010–2013, whereas 𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖 takes on a value of 
1 for cohorts who are now at least 21 years old, but who had been previously affected by the 
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CARD Act. Specifically, these will be individuals born in 1990 or later but 21 years old, or 
older, in year t. 
Affected individuals who were relatively older when the Act was first enacted had more 
opportunities to obtain credit prior to the Act’s passage. Equation (6) distinguishes the currently 
affected and previously affected variables by the cohorts’ age as of Dec 31, 2010—the initial age 
at which the cohort was affected by the Act. Among cohorts currently affected in the post-CARD 
years, there are cohorts that were ages 20, 19, 18, and under-18 when the Act passed.20 Cohorts 
previously affected but now at least 21 years old within the sample years were ages 20, 19, and 
18 when the Act passed.21 
(6) 𝐿𝑈𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖
= 𝛼 + � 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑈𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖𝑖20
𝑖=17
+ � 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖𝑖20
𝑖=17+ 𝜌𝑎 + 𝜃𝑎 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑈𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑎𝑎𝑖 . 
The variable 𝐻𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑈𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖𝑖 takes on a value of 1 for cohorts of age a in year t who 
were initially affected by the Act at age i and are still under age 21, whereas  
𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐶𝐻𝐸𝐶𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐻𝑃𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑖𝑖 takes on a value of 1 for cohorts of age a in year t who were initially 
affected by the Act at age i and are at least 21 years old in year t.  
The Act allows individuals to obtain credit by independently verifying an ability to repay debt. 
Though, Hawkins (2012) provides evidence that college students have obtained credit by using 
student loans and family income to bypass weak verification procedures. This process may take 
                                                 
20 Under-18 is referenced as 17 in the summation operator in Equation (6). 
21 Cohorts under age 18 in 2010 all remain under age 21 through the final year of the sample in 2013. 
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consumer savviness and financial literacy which would be associated with higher educated 
individuals. I expect that individuals with higher income and financial literacy would have the 
easiest time obtaining credit. 
On the other hand, individuals from wealthier households may have credit-worthy parents 
willing to co-sign for credit cards (which do not show up as an “owned” credit card in this 
sample) or provide intra-household loans. Individuals from lower-income households may have 
greater need for credit and may be more willing to put in effort to bypass the Act so as to avoid 
costlier alternatives such as reducing consumption or using payday loans. 
I split pumas into high and low levels of poverty and education. Specifically, I label pumas as 
being in the top and bottom 50% fraction of low-income households (those earning less than 
$25,000 annually) and the top and bottom 50% fraction of adults aged 25 or older with at least a 
bachelor’s degree. I then fully interact the predictors of interest from equations (4) and (5) with 
indicators for being in the high or low fraction low-income pumas. In addition, I interact the 
poverty and education measures and re-estimate the models with these four mutually exclusive 
categories of high and low rates of poverty and degree attainment. 
Finally, Debaut et al. (2014) found evidence of anticipation effects in their sample: underage 
individuals obtaining credit cards earlier than they might have, absent the Act. This phenomenon 
could bias estimates of Act’s impact, because underage individuals would have a particularly 
high error term in the pre-period, leading to a steep estimated decline in the post-period.  
To account for this, I re-estimate models one through six excluding the year 2009, and find that 
all the results hold, and that the estimates are comparable. There may be less evidence of 
anticipatory effects in my sample for two reasons. First, I include individuals younger than age 
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20 in the pre-Act years so that the cohorts who anticipate the Act are still under 21 after the Act 
passes. For these additional cohorts, the treated group has a high error term in both the pre- and 
post-Act periods. In addition, I use estimates representative of the entire population, and not just 
those with a credit history by age 18. Those individuals who entered the credit markets by age 18 
may be particularly likely to have been aware of the CARD Act and responded accordingly. 
Section 6 Results 
Table 3 displays the impact of the CARD Act on credit card ownership among the affected 
population. The first two columns of Table 3 display the impact of being ever affected by the age 
restrictions of the CARD Act, as estimated in Equation (4). Column 1 excludes economic 
controls while Column 2 includes 𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑈𝐻𝑃𝑈𝐻𝐻𝑃𝐸𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖 and is the preferred specification. Affected 
cohorts saw an overall reduction of 0.55 log points after the enactment of the Act. Economic 
controls explain 26% of this, leaving the CARD Act having reduced credit card ownership by an 
estimated 0.404 log points.  
The outcome is in log points, which can be difficult to interpret. For each affected group, I 
calculate the baseline mean22 and convert the coefficient estimates–from the specifications that 
include economic controls–into estimated reductions off the baseline mean due to the Act. The 
first row of columns 4 and 5 shows that the CARD Act led to a 9 percentage point decline in 
credit card ownership among those ever affected by the Act. At baseline, 27% of individuals of 
ages that would be affected by the Act during the sample (ages 18-23) had a credit card. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 display the impact of being currently or previously affected by the 
Act as estimated in Equation (5). Column 4 includes economic controls in the specification. In 
                                                 
22 Specifically, I calculate the mean fraction with a credit card among individuals of the same age as each affected 
group using years 2006-2009. 
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Column 4, we see that the impact of the Act is, not surprisingly, concentrated on those cohorts 
still affected in the observation year. The impact of the Act on currently affected cohorts is a 
reduction of 0.498 log points. There is a smaller, but meaningful impact on those previously 
affected but now over 21 years old. The Act reduces card ownership among this group by 0.252 
log points. This translates into a 7 percentage point and 8 percentage point decline off baseline 
means of 18% and 35% respectively for the currently and previously affected groups. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 display the impact of being currently or previously affected by the 
Act, varying by the cohort’s age as of Dec 31, 2010, as estimated in Equation (6). Column 6 
shows results inclusive of economic controls. Within both currently and previously affected 
cohorts, there is a monotonic relationship between the estimated impact of the CARD Act on 
card ownership and the age of the cohort when the Act was enacted. Specifically, cohorts who 
were youngest when the Act was passed witness the greatest reductions in credit card ownership 
due to the Act. This is expected, as older cohorts had a greater opportunity to obtain credit prior 
to its passage.  
Individuals who were under-18, 18, 19, and 20 as of Dec 2010 observe a decrease of 0.768, 
0.604, 0.474, and 0.348 log points respectively. This translates into a reduction in the fraction of 
individuals in the cohort with a credit card of 53%, 45%, 37%, and 29% respectively (dividing 
the estimated reduction by the baseline mean), while currently affected by the Act. These 
reductions vary from the baseline mean values of 18%, 18, 23%, and 28% respectively. 
Individuals who were aged 18, 19, and 20 as of Dec 2010, but who are age 21 or older in year t, 
observe a decrease of 0.580, 0.409, and 0.246 log points respectively. This translates into 
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decreases of 44%, 34%, and 22% from the baseline percent of individuals with a credit card: 
33%, 34%, and 36% respectively. 
It may seem surprising that individuals who were 18 when the Act passed observe a very similar 
estimated impact of the Act when currently affected or previously affected. However, this cohort 
has only one period when it is labeled as previously affected—in 2013, when 21 years of age as 
of December 31st. Many individuals in this cohort may have only just turned 21 for a few 
months by the end of 2013. In addition, this cohort had a larger “dosage” of the Act than any 
other group of 21-year-olds in the sample. 
Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients and predicted percentage declines obtained from re-
estimating Equation (5) and interacting the predictors of interest with variables reflecting the 
demographic composition of the puma. Column 1 of Table 4 shows the impact of being currently 
and previously affected by the Act across pumas with a high or low fraction of low-income 
households.  
In pumas with an above-average fraction of low-income households (Row 2, “Above Median Pct 
Poverty”), individuals currently affected by the Act see a reduction in credit card ownership of 
0.56 log points. Columns 4 and 5 show that this represents a decline of 0.065 (43%) from a 
baseline mean of 0.152. In those same high-poverty pumas, individuals previously affected by 
the Act see a reduction in credit card ownership of 0.301 log points. This represents a decline of 
0.082 (26%) from a baseline of 0.317.  In low-poverty pumas, individuals currently affected by 
the Act observe a 35% decline in credit card ownership off a baseline of 0.201.  In the same low-
poverty pumas, individuals previously affected by the Act face a 16% reduction in credit card 
ownership from a baseline of 0.392. 
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Column 2 of Table 4 displays the results of estimating Equation (5), with separate estimated 
effects across pumas with high or low fraction of adults over age 25 who have attained at least a 
B.A. degree. Individuals from pumas with relatively lower degree attainment face a steeper 
decline in credit card ownership due to the Act. Though, the differential impact across education 
level is not nearly as great as the difference across poverty levels. 
For the final specification, I assign pumas to the interaction of high/low poverty rates and 
high/low rates of degree attainment.23 Column 3 of Table 4 demonstrates again that the impact of 
the CARD Act is more varied across poverty than education rates. The percentage reduction in 
credit card ownership due to the Act is greater (and the baseline smaller) in high poverty areas – 
regardless of educational achievement – than in low poverty areas for both currently and 
previously affected individuals. 
Table 5 displays the results from re-estimating Equations (4) through (6) but excluding the year 
2009 in case of anticipatory effects. I find that the point estimates without economic controls are 
mostly unchanged, while the estimates with economic controls become even larger in magnitude. 
Perhaps this is because 2009 was a year in which there was both a sharp economic downturn as 
well as a sharp decrease in credit card ownership among young people. Therefore, removing this 
year removes a lot of variation in card ownership due to economic conditions. 
Section 7 Conclusions 
During the years 2010 through 2013, the age restrictions of the CARD Act have affected more 
than 25 million individuals between the ages of 18 and 20. The Act was passed in part due to 
misleading statistics on credit card use among undergraduates. I estimate that, absent the Act, 
                                                 
23 The high poverty/low B.A. and low poverty/high B.A. groups each have a 37% share of pumas. The high 
poverty/high B.A. and low poverty/low B.A. each have a 13% share.  
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only 15%–20% of 18–20-year-olds would have had a credit card in their own name during the 
years 2010–2013. 
While the intention of the Act was to safeguard young adults from becoming over indebted, it is 
possible the Act could have adverse long-term consequences due to having a thin credit file later 
in life. Loopholes in the Act allow for some individuals under the age of 21 to obtain credit, and 
one survey suggests these loopholes are being utilized.  
I find evidence that the CARD Act reduced credit card access by nearly 50% for individuals who 
were 18 years old or younger when the Act first went into effect, and there are lingering 
reductions in credit card ownership even after affected individuals turn 21. The impact is smaller 
for cohorts who were either 19 or 20 years old when the Act passed, likely because many of 
these individuals had already obtained credit cards prior to the Act’s effective date.  
Post-CARD, obtaining credit while under the age of 21 requires a certain level of consumer 
savviness, in addition to being able to demonstrate an ability to repay debt. I find that the 
reduction in card ownership among young adults is greater in areas with a high fraction of low-
income households. This situation has the potential to be particularly harmful. Specifically, 
individuals with the least amount of income (and likely wealth) are now left without a common 
form of temporary debt financing. This could lead low-income individuals to substitute toward 
more costly forms of debt, such as payday lending. 
In ongoing research, I am looking to see how consumers have responded to this reduction in 
credit risk. I have preliminary evidence that individuals from low-income households have 
substituted into alternative financial services, which includes payday lending.  
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Figure II.1. Fraction of Individuals Aged 18–23 in the US with a Credit Card in Their Own Name. Lines represent birth year 
cohorts. Cohorts born in 1991–1992 were aged 18–19 when the CARD Act went into effect in 2010 and are the most restricted 
by the Act. Cohorts born in 1989–1990 were aged 20–21 by Dec 31, 2010 and may have been moderately restricted. Cohorts 
born in 1985–1988 were unaffected by the age restrictions of the CARD Act. Data is from the Equifax/Consumer Credit Panel 
aggregated by age and year to the national level.
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Figure II.2.  Natural Log of the Fraction of Individuals in the US with a Credit Card in Their Own Name as of December 31st of 
Each Year. The vertical red line represents the effective date of the CARD Act (Febuary 2010). The "Over 21" line represents 
individuals aged 21–24 in each year. "Under 21" represents individuals aged18–20. Data comes from the Equifax/Consumer Credit 
Panel aggregated by age and year to the national level.
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Figure II.3. Net Percentage of Domestic Banks Tightening Lending Standards on Consumer Loans and Credit Cards.  Shaded 
areas indicate US recessions. Reported net fractions equal the fraction of banks that reported having tightened lending standards 
over the past three months minus the fraction of banks that reported having eased standards. Data comes from the  Federal 
Reserve Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices. This figure was downloaded from 
research.stlouisfed.org.
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Figure II.4.  Regression-Adjusted Natural Log of the Fraction of Individuals in the US with a Credit Card in Their Own Name as 
of December 31st of Each Year. Plotted are residuals from a regression on puma and age fixed effects and flexible controls for the 
economic conditions individuals faced at each age using years 2006 through 2009 and predicting out of sample for 2010–2013. The 
vertical red line represents the effective date of the CARD Act (February 2010). "Over 21" includes individuals aged 21–24 while 
"Under 21" includes those aged 18-20.
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of Pumas 980 980 980 980 980 980 972 972
5% Sample Equifax Population 779,244 774,972 747,254 712,462 676,642 595,069 514,477 660,592
5% Sample Puma Population 1,467,233 1,469,880 1,483,446 1,506,228 1,528,370 1,539,843 1,516,998 1,548,797
Fraction Equifax Population with Credit Card 47% 49% 48% 41% 37% 36% 45% 38%
Fraction Total Population with Credit Card 29% 30% 28% 24% 21% 18% 16% 18%
Mean Statewide Unemployment Rate 4.64 4.61 5.81 9.26 9.65 8.99 8.11 7.39
Mean Per-Capita State GDP 49,065 49,356 48,607 46,896 47,517 47,882 48,737 49,250
Mean Growth in Per-Capita State GDP 1.7% 0.4% -1.7% -3.9% 1.3% 0.8% 1.7% 1.1%
Mean Per-Capita Outstanding Mortgage Balances 33,810 37,749 39,015 37,322 35,491 34,684 33,665 32,047
Mean Growth in Per-Capita Mortgage Balances 13.6% 11.4% 4.0% -3.7% -4.3% -1.8% -2.6% -4.7%
Table II.1. Summary Statistics of Credit Card Ownership and Economic Conditions Facing 18–24 Year Olds.
Notes:  Equifax and credit card ownership data come from the Equifax/Consumer Credit Panel under management of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Puma population is 
estimated using county-level intercensal estimates and a county-puma mapping from the Missouri Census Data Center. Unemployment and GDP statistics are from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Statewide per-capita mortgage balances are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Means are weighted by the population of the puma in each year. 
Unemployment, GDP, and mortgage data are at the state-year level and are not age specific.
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Age 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
18 No No
Affected at Age 18 
and Still Affected
Affected by Age 18 
and Still Affected
Affected by Age 18 
and Still Affected
Affected by Age 18 
and Still Affected
19 No No
Affected at Age 19 
and Still Affected
Affected at Age 18 
and Still Affected
Affected by Age 18 
and Still Affected
Affected by Age 18 
and Still Affected
20 No No
Affected at Age 20 
and Still Affected
Affected at Age 19 
and Still Affected
Affected at Age 18 
and Still Affected
Affected by Age 18 
and Still Affected
21 No No No
Was Affected at 
Age 20
Was Affected at 
Age 19
Was Affected at 
Age 18
22 No No No No
Was Affected at 
Age 20
Was Affected at 
Age 19
23 No No No No No
Was Affected at 
Age 20
Notes : The table represents the exposure to the CARD Act for individuals of a particular age each year. The red arrow represents a cohort: Individuals aged 18 
in 2009 are then age 19 in 2010 and so forth.  Green boxes represent groups unaffected by the Act through that year. Orange boxes (top right rectangle) are 
groups restricted by the Act in that year. Yellow boxes (bottom right triangle) are cohorts that were previously restricted by the Act, but now of an age where 
the restrictions are no longer binding. Text denotes "dosage": the age at which first affected, if ever, by the Act through that year.
Table II.2.  Intensity of the CARD Act Age Restrictions for Individuals of Each Age over Time.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Mean 
Fraction with a 
Credit Card
Estimated 
Reduction due to 
the CARD Act
Ever Affected (Year >= 2010 · Birth Cohort >= 1990) -0.550*** -0.404*** 0.27 0.09
(0.006) (0.012)
Currently Affected (Under 21 · Ever Affected) -0.759*** -0.498*** 0.18 0.07
(0.007) (0.012)
Previously Affected (Over 21 · Ever Affected) -0.294*** -0.252*** 0.35 0.08
(0.006) (0.013)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort >= 1993 (Under 18 as of 12/31/2010) -0.923*** -0.768*** 0.18 0.09
(0.011) (0.019)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort = 1992 (Age 18 as of 12/31/2010) -0.829*** -0.604*** 0.18 0.08
(0.010) (0.017)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort = 1991 (Age 19 as of 12/31/2010) -0.669*** -0.474*** 0.23 0.09
(0.010) (0.014)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort = 1990 (Age 20 as of 12/31/2010) -0.413*** -0.348*** 0.28 0.08
(0.008) (0.017)
Previously Affected · Birth Cohort = 1992 (Age 18 as of 12/31/2010) -0.672*** -0.580*** 0.33 0.14
(0.012) (0.020)
Previously Affected · Birth Cohort = 1991 (Age 19 as of 12/31/2010) -0.506*** -0.409*** 0.34 0.11
(0.008) (0.016)
Previously Affected · Birth Cohort = 1990 (Age 20 as of 12/31/2010) -0.278*** -0.246*** 0.36 0.08
(0.006) (0.014)
Observations 126,750 126,750 126,750 126,750 126,750 126,750
R-squared 0.861 0.879 0.870 0.880 0.874 0.881
Economic Controls X X X
Notes : Observations are at the puma-year-age level. Outcome is the natural log of the fraction of individuals with a credit card for years 2006–2013 based on year-end credit bureau data. All regressions include fixed effects 
for puma, age, and year. Birth cohort of 1990 is the oldest "full cohort" that was affected by the Act as no individuals were age 21 as of Feb 2010.  Individuals born in 1993 do not reach age 21 during the sample period, 
which is why there is no "Previously Affected" result for that cohort. Robust standard errors are clustered at the puma-birthyear level and are presented in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population count 
within each puma-year-age cell. The baseline mean represents the mean fraction of individuals with a credit card among individuals of the same age in the pre-Act period. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table II.3. Causal Impact of the CARD Act on the Logged Fraction of Individuals with a Credit Card.
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(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Mean 
Fraction with a 
Credit Card
Estimated 
Reduction due to 
the CARD Act
Currently Affected · Below Median Pct Poverty -0.425*** 0.201 0.070
(0.014)
Currently Affected · Above Median Pct Poverty -0.560*** 0.152 0.065
(0.014)
Previously Affected · Below Median Pct Poverty -0.178*** 0.392 0.064
(0.014)
Previously Affected · Above Median Pct Poverty -0.301*** 0.317 0.082
(0.014)
Currently Affected · Below Median Pct B.A. -0.522*** 0.161 0.065
(0.014)
Currently Affected · Above Median Pct B.A. -0.477*** 0.193 0.073
(0.014)
Previously Affected · Below Median Pct B.A. -0.274*** 0.322 0.077
(0.014)
Previously Affected · Above Median Pct B.A. -0.233*** 0.388 0.081
(0.014)
Currently Affected · High Poverty-Low B.A. -0.544*** 0.149 0.063
(0.036)
Currently Affected · High Poverty-High B.A. -0.598*** 0.160 0.072
(0.036)
Currently Affected · Low Poverty-Low B.A. -0.438*** 0.193 0.068
(0.041)
Currently Affected · Low Poverty-High B.A. -0.419*** 0.204 0.070
(0.042)
Previously Affected · High Poverty-Low B.A. -0.289*** 0.304 0.076
(0.036)
Previously Affected · High Poverty-High B.A. -0.326*** 0.354 0.098
(0.036)
Previously Affected · Low Poverty-Low B.A. -0.186*** 0.373 0.063
(0.035)
Previously Affected · Low Poverty-High B.A. -0.175*** 0.399 0.064
(0.036)
Observations 126,750 126,750 126,750
R-squared 0.881 0.880 0.881
Economic Controls X X X
Table II.4. Heterogenous Impacts of the CARD Act by Pre-CARD Demographic Characteristics of the Puma.
Notes : Observations at the puma-year-age level. Outcome is the natural log of the fraction of individuals with a credit card for years 2006–2013 based on year-end credit bureau data. 
All regressions include flexible economic controls and fixed effects for puma, age, and year. Robust standard errors are clustered at the puma-birthyear level and are presented in 
parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population count within each puma-year-age cell.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ever Affected (Year >= 2010 · Birth Cohort >= 1990) -0.579*** -0.540***
(0.006) (0.017)
Currently Affected (Under 21 · Ever Affected) -0.859*** -0.752***
(0.008) (0.018)
Previously Affected (Over 21 · Ever Affected) -0.287*** -0.418***
(0.007) (0.016)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort >= 1993 (Under 18 as of 12/31/2010) -1.047*** -1.167***
(0.011) (0.024)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort = 1992 (Age 18 as of 12/31/2010) -0.934*** -0.974***
(0.010) (0.023)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort = 1991 (Age 19 as of 12/31/2010) -0.753*** -0.795***
(0.010) (0.021)
Currently Affected · Birth Cohort = 1990 (Age 20 as of 12/31/2010) -0.478*** -0.510***
(0.009) (0.021)
Previously Affected · Birth Cohort = 1992 (Age 18 as of 12/31/2010) -0.692*** -0.891***
(0.012) (0.023)
Previously Affected · Birth Cohort = 1991 (Age 19 as of 12/31/2010) -0.523*** -0.683***
(0.008) (0.020)
Previously Affected · Birth Cohort = 1990 (Age 20 as of 12/31/2010) -0.290*** -0.403***
(0.006) (0.016)
Observations 110,634 110,634 110,634 110,634 110,634 110,634
R-squared 0.859 0.878 0.872 0.879 0.878 0.882
Unemployment and GDP Controls X X X
Notes : Observations at the puma-year-age level. Outcome is the natural log of the fraction of individuals with a credit card for years 2006-2008, 2010-2013 based on year-end 
credit bureau data. All regressions include fixed effects for puma, age, and year. Birth cohort of 1990 is the oldest "full cohort" that was affected by the Act as no individuals were 
age 21 as of Feb 2010.  Individuals born in 1993 do not reach age 21 during the sample period, which is why there is no "Previously Affected" result for that cohort. Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the puma-birthyear level and are presented in parentheses. Observations are weighted by the population count within each puma-year-age cell.  *** 
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table II.5. Causal Impact of the CARD Act on the Logged Fraction of Individuals with a Credit Card. Excludes Year 2009.
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CHAPTER III 
Choosing Delinquency? Ranking Student Loans on the Repayment Hierarchy 
 
Section 1 Introduction 
Student loan cohort default rates have been increasing steadily since the graduating cohort of 
2005, and the 2010 graduating cohort had reached the highest level under the modern definition 
of default.1  Student loan delinquency rates have climbed steadily since 2003 even as 
delinquency rates in other debt markets have fallen since 2010.2  These increasing rates have 
attracted attention in the media, and among policymakers and researchers seeking to understand 
why borrowers are not repaying their student loans.  
Recent surveys of the student loan default literature have suggested a number of factors related 
to default and delinquency, mostly related to student and school characteristics. However, there 
are very few studies that consider student loan repayment within a model of consumer choice. 
Each period, households face choices on where to allocate their income and wealth: to 
consumption, for savings, and to repayment of other debts including auto loans, mortgages, and 
credit card balances. In addition, the relative incentives to repay certain debts can change over 
time with market conditions. For example, variable interest rates, home prices, and knowledge of 
the consequences of non-repayment could potentially influence the consumer’s choice.  
                                                     
1 http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/defaultrates.html 
2 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/householdcredit/DistrictReport_Q22013.pdf 
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This study demonstrates how the debt repayment hierarchy can be observed in the publicly 
available Survey of Consumer Finances, and offers preliminary evidence for understanding these 
repayment preferences. The evidence suggests that consumers prioritize student loan repayment 
below other installment debts, including auto and home loans. First, when consumers have 
multiple loans and are delinquent on some—but not all—of their debts, households 
overwhelmingly choose to miss student loan payments. In addition, when households have just a 
single loan, there is evidence to suggest that, relative to consumption, the repayment of student 
loans has a lower priority than home mortgage or vehicle loans. We cannot observe credit card 
delinquency in the data. 
Repayment prioritization should be important for a number of reasons. From a policy 
perspective, all student loans originated since July 2010 are Direct Loans owned by the 
Department of Education. Non-repayment of student loans in favor of private, non-education 
loans shifts credit risk from private lenders to taxpayers. In addition, policies that alter 
parameters of the student loan market may have consequences in other debt markets. For 
example, changing the consequences for non-repayment of student loans may alter repayment 
preferences, shifting delinquencies to and from other debt markets. 
From an economic perspective, we may be concerned that consumers are not behaving 
optimally. Recent surveys suggest that borrowers in default are mostly unaware of the 
consequences of default, and unaware of alternative repayment options such as income-based 
repayment (e.g., Loonin & McLaughlin, 2012). Theory suggests that borrowers weigh the 
benefits and consequences of consumption, saving, and repayment of debt, allocating resources 
across the three during each period. A rational consumer who underestimates the consequences 
of non-repayment of student loans may thus sub-optimally allocate financial resources.  
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This study has two research questions:   
1. How do consumers prioritize education loans relative to other installment loans?   
2. How can this prioritization be explained through observed loan characteristics? 
The rest of the paper is set up as follows: Section 2 is a review of the relevant literature. Section 
3 describes the data, construction of key variables, and the analysis sample. Section 4 displays 
stylized facts from the data, which demonstrate the repayment prioritization. Section 5 describes 
the repayment prioritization model. Section 6 describes the results, and Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
Section 2 Contribution to the Literature 
This study contributes to multiple threads of the academic literature related to consumer credit. 
First, there are very few studies explicitly modeling the consumer’s decision-making process 
regarding delinquency. Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010) used credit bureau data to isolate 
households who have both a credit card and a home mortgage and miss a payment in exactly one 
type of debt. They modeled the event of households missing a home mortgage payment while 
making credit card payments on time, and found that liquidity concerns dominate this decision. 
Specifically, households who have credit card balances close to the limit will choose to miss 
home mortgage payments while paying down credit card balances, even when there is equity in 
the home. The results are counter to industry expectations that consumers will pay their 
mortgages first when there is positive home equity.  
TransUnion (2012) displays summary statistics on the repayment prioritization over time of 
home mortgages versus auto loans. This study also isolated consumers who are delinquent on 
exactly one type of debt, and found that the repayment priority of consumers who had 
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historically favored home mortgages shifted to auto loans during the U.S. mortgage default 
crisis, and then shifted back toward mortgages as home prices stabilized since the 2008-09 
recession. 
Ionescu and Ionescu (2015) have a recent working paper modeling the decision of consumers to 
choose default—a more severe option than delinquency—on either student loans or credit cards, 
but not both. They found evidence of cross-market effects: Credit card debt amplifies the 
likelihood of defaulting on student loans. The authors argued that this is due to differences in 
bankruptcy regulations and consumers’ desire for liquidity: Financially constrained borrowers 
find it optimal to default on student loans in order to maintain access to the credit card market. 
A second literature thread examines consumer repayment of individual debts, with a particular 
emphasis on student loan default. Most of the studies on student loan default are correlation 
studies, identifying factors that are related to default. For example, Gross, Cekic, Hossler, and 
Hillman (2009) and Loonin and McLaughlin (2012) detailed a number of characteristics often 
found to be related to student loan default, such as educational experience (attainment, degree, 
major choice), student characteristics at college entry, institutional characteristics, employment 
and earnings, student debt levels, and attitudes toward student loan debt. In a causal paper on 
student loan default, Hershaff (2015) demonstrated that increasing financial incentives to the 
lender to keep borrowers out of default reduced borrower default rates, especially among 
borrowers at for-profit colleges. 
A number of studies have looked at the causes and correlates of default in other debt markets. 
Elul, Souleles, Chomsisengphet, Glennon, and Hunt (2010) showed that illiquidity and negative 
equity “trigger” mortgage default. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) demonstrated that the 
80
ease of securitization reduced lender screening, which increased default rates. Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales (2013) found that in March 2009, 26% of defaults were “strategic,”—due to 
negative home equity—which increased to 35% by September 2010. Agarwal, Ambrose, and 
Chomsisengphet (2008) found that auto loan defaults are related to weak credit, age of the car, 
and the loan-to-value ratio of the vehicle. 
This study first demonstrates that households typically place student loans below home mortgage 
and vehicle debt on the repayment hierarchy. Relative loan age is an important predictor of the 
repayment decision: Younger loans are more likely to be repaid on schedule. Increased equity in 
the home is correlated with lower mortgage delinquency rates, but there is no evidence that 
equity in a vehicle affects the probability of vehicle loan repayment. 
Section 3 Data and Analysis Sample 
Data for this study comes from the 2001–2010 public versions of the Survey of Consumer 
Finances. The SCF has existed in its current form (with some survey questions added or dropped 
over the years) since 1989, and is updated every three years. The 2001–2007 surveys each have 
approximately 4,500 unique households, while the 2010 survey has closer to 6,500 households. 
The surveys form a repeated cross section, but not a panel. Over time, many of the questions 
related to debt, income, and assets are repeated, but to different households. 
The unit of analysis is the Primary Economic Unit (PEU), which consists of all financially 
interdependent members of the household. Income, debts, and assets are aggregated across all 
members of the PEU. This means that specific debts (such as student loans) are not tied to an 
individual member of the household and that individual’s reported income. It is the respondent’s 
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choice whether to include college students who may not be living full-time at home—and their 
student loan debt—in the PEU.3 
Each survey consists of thousands of questions related to household demographics, net worth and 
assets, annual income, debt levels, and the terms and status of debt repayment. There is no 
geographic information available in the public surveys.4 Many financial products (e.g., bonds 
and commercial real estate) are held by a small number of households, so the surveys oversample 
high-net-worth households who might hold these products.  
To account for non-response and allow for a distribution of imputed values, multiple imputation 
methods are used, and each household is represented by five implicates in the survey. In 
addition, for privacy purposes, some known variables were given random error across implicates. 
Sample weights are provided to make each survey representative of the U.S. population.  
The outcome of interest is whether a borrower is behind schedule on a loan payment for each 
type of installment loan within the household. Because this is a cross section, I cannot identify 
loans that have already been paid off in full, or loans that were previously delinquent but are now 
being paid back on schedule. There are two steps to determining whether a loan is behind 
schedule.  
First, the household is asked about the repayment status for each individual loan. The answers 
can be (a) ahead of schedule, (b) on schedule, (c) behind schedule, or (d) missing/not applicable. 
I consider a loan to be “in repayment” if the respondent has provided a non-missing repayment 
status. A loan can have a missing repayment status if the borrower does not have to make 
payments. While only 2% of mortgage loans and 5% of vehicle loans have a missing repayment 
                                                     
3 From email correspondence with the Federal Reserve Board. 
4 Not even the Census region is available to researchers outside the SCF group within the Board. 
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status, approximately 50% of reported student loans have a missing status.5 The repayment status 
question could capture in-school deferral, economic hardship deferral, or forbearance, among 
possibly other respondent interpretations of the question.  
Second, among those in repayment, I consider an individual loan to be delinquent if the 
repayment status is provided as (c) behind schedule. Households may have multiple loans within 
a single debt type; for example, a household may have more than one student loan. A household 
is considered delinquent on student loans if at least one student loan is reported behind schedule. 
The repayment status is defined similarly for mortgage and vehicle loans. Interest rates and loan 
age are defined as the balance-weighted average of all loans within that debt type. For this 
analysis, mortgage loans are defined as loans backed by the principal residence. Vehicle loans 
include any installment loan for personally owned cars or trucks, as well as “other owned 
vehicles” such as an RV, a motorcycle, or a boat. A household is considered delinquent on 
mortgage or vehicle loans if at least one mortgage or vehicle loan is behind schedule.  
For some households, one survey implicate may have different values than another implicate, 
even for binary indicators. 2.8% of households that have at least one implicate with a student 
loan have at least one implicate that says it does not have a student loan. This falls to 0.5% and 
0.2% for mortgage and vehicle loans.6 
I restricted the sample to households where the respondent’s age is less than 45. I did this to 
reduce the possibility of (a) adult children living at home, and (b) a PEU consisting of education 
                                                     
5 This figure approximately matches the current proportion of student loan borrowers in repayment from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York’s Consumer Credit Panel. It also matches ED’s 2014 reported 47% of student loans in 
repayment retrieved May 18, 2015: https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio. 
6 I re-estimate the model excluding all households with an inter-implicate conflict on either having an education, 
vehicle, or mortgage loan in repayment or it being paid on-schedule. Results are similar. 
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debt for the children and vehicle or home mortgage debt for the parents. For such households, it 
is reasonable to conclude that the decision to miss student loan payments may be the child’s and 
not the parents’. This restriction comes at a cost: Over the past ten years, approximately 25%–
35% of student loan balances have been held by individuals aged 40 or older.7  
This study presents three distinct components that describe the repayment hierarchy of 
installment debt. The first follows the methodology of Cohen-Cole and Morse (2010) and 
Transunion (2012): Households with multiple debts which become delinquent on one debt while 
paying another on schedule reveal a repayment preference across debt types.  
The second component isolates households with exactly one type of loan in repayment. While 
these households cannot reveal a repayment preference across debt types, each household must 
prioritize debt repayment relative to consumption. Within each debt type, I studied the debt 
burden of delinquent households relative to those households currently on schedule. The debt 
burden of student loans is defined as total monthly student loan payments divided by average 
monthly income. The debt burden of mortgage and vehicle loans is defined similarly.  
Finally, the third component explains the prioritization gap through observed loan 
characteristics. I transform the data into loan type-level observations, and estimate the 
probability of delinquency for each loan. Observed loan characteristics explain one third of the 
repayment prioritization of mortgages over student loans, and one quarter of the prioritization of 
vehicle loans over student loans. 
                                                     
7 http://www.newyorkfed.org/regional/Brown_presentation_GWU_2013Q2.pdf 
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Table 1 provides statistics on the prevalence of installment loan debt among households. Column 
1 displays unweighted household counts for each category, and Column 2 displays the 
unweighted number of households with the respondent under age 45.  
Rows 2–5 relate to the first component of the study: the delinquency choice of households with 
multiple loans in repayment. Among households with a respondent under age 45, there are 160 
households that have both an education loan and a mortgage (but not a vehicle) loan, and 238 
households with an education loan, home mortgage, and vehicle loan. This combines to make 
398 unique households with both an education loan and a home mortgage in repayment. 
Among households with a respondent under age 45, there are 166 households with an education 
loan and a vehicle loan (but not a mortgage) and 238 households with all three. Combined, this 
makes 404 unique households with both a vehicle and education loan in repayment. The 238 
households with all three loan types have both loan pairs. Altogether, there are 564 unique, 
eligible households that have an education loan and either a mortgage or vehicle loan, or both. 
The age restriction reduces the sample by about one third. 
The next three rows relate to the second component of this study. Among eligible households, 
there are 212 single-loan households with a student loan, 1,403 single-loan households with a 
home mortgage, and 931 single-loan households with a vehicle loan.8 
Section 4 Stylized Facts9 
This section provides summary evidence of the relative prioritization of debt repayment among 
households.  
                                                     
8 These do not consider whether a household has an “other” installment loan such as a home improvement loan or 
commercial real estate loan. 
9 Summary statistics are calculated by using all implicates and dividing the sample weights by five. 
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Table 2 further describes the sample making up the loan-pairs component of the study. It begins 
with the sample of 564 households that have an education loan, and either a mortgage or vehicle 
loan, or both, in repayment. Of these, there are 398 (404) households that have a student loan and 
a mortgage (vehicle) loan in repayment, and just 42 (51) of these households are delinquent in 
exactly one loan of the pair. Some households have both loan pairs. Overall, among households 
with student loans, there are 70 unique households that reveal a repayment preference within at 
least one loan pair. 
Table 3 displays the repayment choices facing all households with multiple loans in repayment. 
For each loan pair, the household may be on schedule with both loans, behind schedule with both 
loans, or on schedule with one but not the other (and vice versa). That makes four mutually 
exclusive categories. Concentrating on those with student loans, the table displays the proportion 
of households in each of the four repayment categories separately: households with student loans 
and mortgages, and households with student loans and vehicle loans. As noted, some households 
fall into both loan pair groups.  
The top row of Table 3 displays the repayment status of households with both a student loan and 
a mortgage in repayment. Of these households, 89% are repaying both loans on time, and 1% of 
are behind schedule on both loans. This leaves 10% of households with a student loan and a 
mortgage in one of the “choice” categories. Either the household is behind on the student loan 
and on-schedule with the mortgage, or vice versa. Here, there is a greater than 4:1 ratio of 
households that chose to be delinquent on the student loan relative to those choosing to be 
delinquent on the home mortgage. Households overwhelmingly pay mortgage debt over student 
loans, even though mortgage payments are much greater (see Table 7). 
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The second row displays the repayment status of households with both a student loan and a 
vehicle loan. Here, 12% of households with both of these loan types are choice households, and 
there is a 3:1 ratio of households that chose to be delinquent on student loans relative to those 
choosing to be delinquent on vehicle loans.10 
I divide column 3 by the sum of columns 3 and 4, and obtain a statistic describing the frequency 
of student loan delinquency when households are delinquent on exactly one loan in the pair. For 
example, when consumers repay exactly one debt on time among the mortgage-education loan 
pair, they choose to repay home mortgage loans 81% of the time. Table 4 displays this statistic 
for each loan pair over time. 
Within each survey year, there are a very small number of loan pairs with exactly one loan in 
delinquency. While I do not make any claims over time trends, this table demonstrates that the 
repayment hierarchy is not driven by a single survey year.  Across surveys, the smallest percent 
of households choosing student loan delinquency over mortgage delinquency was 75%, while the 
smallest percent of households choosing student loan delinquency over vehicle delinquency was 
67%. 
Approximately 45% of households that are delinquent on one installment loan have no other 
installment loans in repayment.11 While these single-loan households cannot prioritize debt 
repayment across installment loans, each still allocates resources between consumption and debt 
repayment, and thus must prioritize debt repayment relative to consumption. To my knowledge, 
                                                     
10 I replicate this without the under-45 age restriction and display results in appendix Table A1. The repayment 
ratios of mortgage to education loans and vehicle to education loans are each approximately 4:1. 
11 Author’s calculation among the analysis sample. 
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this paper is the first to study the relative prioritization of installment debts among single-loan 
households.12 
To investigate, I compare the monthly debt burden of households behind schedule on payments 
to those on schedule for each loan type. For student loans, home mortgages, and vehicle loans 
separately, I define the debt burden of each loan type as  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚ℎ𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑚𝑙𝑚 𝑝𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑝𝑚𝑚(𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑝/12) . 
Debt burden is difficult to compare across debt types. Households with only student loan debt are 
likely much different than households with only mortgage debt. Further, apartment rental costs 
are difficult to compare to home mortgage debt, as are public transportation costs relative to 
vehicle loans.  
Within each debt type, I calculate the debt burden for all single-loan households and identify the 
fraction of borrowers that are paying behind schedule at each level of debt burden. Figure 1 
displays the relationship between debt burden and delinquency rates within single-loan 
households for each of the three loan types studied.  
Delinquency rates among single-loan households with education loans are meaningfully higher 
than rates among single-loan households with vehicle or mortgage debt. In addition, there is a 
fairly high rate of delinquent households with very low levels of education debt relative to 
income. Recall that these households by construction have no other installment loans that they 
need to pay off.  Yet, approximately 15% of single-loan households with education debt burdens 
less than 5% of total income are delinquent on their loans. 
                                                     
12 A conversation with the Fair Isaac Corporation suggested that this is a measure of interest within the credit 
scoring industry. 
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The fraction of delinquent households rises rapidly and immediately with debt burden among 
households with education loans, especially compared to those with mortgage debt. Among 
single-loan households with mortgage debt, the delinquency rate rises very slowly with debt 
burden until debt burden reaches 55%, after which it rapidly increases.  In other words, mortgage 
debt holders typically have to reach a threshold where mortgage debt becomes overwhelming 
relative to income before they begin missing payments. Education debt holders simply miss more 
payments as debt burden increases at all levels of debt burden.   
Vehicle debt shows a mixed story among these single-loan households. Like mortgage debt 
holders, households with very low debt burdens due to vehicle loans have very low delinquency 
rates, as expected. Yet, similar to education debt holders, the delinquency rates rise rapidly and 
immediately as debt burden rises. In summary, single-loan households with education debt are 
much more likely to miss student loan payments at all levels of debt burden, including very low 
ones. Delinquency rates on education and vehicle loans rise rapidly with debt burden, while 
delinquency rates on mortgages rise rapidly only after reaching a relatively high threshold.  
Moving forward, I combine the single-loan households with the multiple-loan households and 
use observed loan characteristics to explain the repayment prioritization of student loans. 
Section 5 Model the Repayment Decision within Households 
I transformed the data so that observations are at the household-x-loan type level.13 Equation (1) 
estimates a linear probability model of loan delinquency. A household with a mortgage loan, a 
student loan, and a vehicle loan would have a separate observation for each loan type. 
 (1) 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐵𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐵ℎ𝑙 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝑙 + 𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑖 + 𝜃ℎ + 𝜀ℎ𝑙. 
                                                     
13 Actually, it is at the household-implicate-loan type level, as all five implicates are included. 
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The variable 𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝐵𝑖𝑒𝑒𝐵ℎ𝑙 is an indicator for whether household h reports that at least one 
loan of type l is being paid behind schedule, and 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐵𝑙 is a vector consisting of student 
loan and vehicle loan dummy variables. Mortgage loans make up the excluded category.  
The vector 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝐿ℎ𝐿𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑙 consists of loan characteristics that vary across households. It includes 
the dollar-weighted interest rate and loan age, and aggregate loan payments within each loan 
type for the household. The vector also includes the equity in the asset and an indicator for 
having zero or negative equity. Equity is defined as the fraction of the asset not covered by the 
loan, and takes on a negative value when the loan amount exceeds the value of the asset.14 
These latter two variables are assigned a value of zero for student loans, and estimated with 
separate coefficients for vehicle and mortgage loans. Because of the recourse property of loans, 
the equity variables are estimated separately by loan type. Vehicle loans often have recourse, 
which means that lenders can not only confiscate the collateral upon delinquency, but can sue the 
consumer for the gap between the value of the asset and the loan. Mortgages typically are non-
recourse loans, and so “walking away” from a mortgage on a property with zero equity can be a 
strategic decision. 𝜃ℎ is a vector of household fixed effects, and 𝜀ℎ𝑙 is an error term unrelated to 
loan type. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and account for multiple 
imputations. I choose not to use survey weights, so that each household is counted equally, and is 
not weighted by wealth.15 
                                                     
14 Specifically, Equity = 1-�
𝑙𝑚𝑙𝑚 𝑙𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑚𝑚
𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑚 𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝 �. 
15 There are also technical reasons for not using weights. The program provided by the Federal Reserve to account 
for multiple imputations for standard error calculations has trouble dealing with regressions that use both survey 
weights and a large number of fixed effects to be absorbed. To test the implications, I re-estimate the model using all 
five implicates unweighted, the first implicate unweighted, and the first implicate weighted.  The results, displayed 
in appendix Table A3, are nearly identical using each method, suggesting that weights do not affect the results. 
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Table 6 displays the mean value of the loan characteristics entering the model. On average, 
education loans are 4.1 years old, compared to 3.1 years for mortgages and 1.7 years for vehicle 
loans. The interest rate on student loans is typically less than those of vehicle and mortgage 
loans, and the payment is meaningfully smaller. The average monthly payment on mortgages is 
more than $1,600 compared to $460 for vehicles and $240 for student loans.  
Households with mortgage loans have, on average, 34% equity in their home. This means that 
the loan size averages 66% of the home value. Just 7% of home mortgage loans are greater than 
the value of the home (zero equity). Those with vehicle loans have, on average, 44% equity, and 
10% of vehicle loans are greater than the value of the asset. Approximately 50% of households 
with a student loan have a mortgage loan, and 50% have a vehicle loan. However, just 12% of 
households with a mortgage have a student loan, and 14% of households with a vehicle loan also 
have an education loan. 
The model is limited by the data available. Ideally, it would include factors related to the 
consequences of non-repayment, information on loans fully paid off, a history of repayment 
status, an accurate linking of debts and income to individuals within the household, and more 
precise information on the length and severity of delinquency.  
Section 6 Results 
Table 7 displays regression estimates building up to equation (1). Column 1 displays the 
regression with only household- and loan-type fixed effects. The delinquency rate on student 
loans is predicted to be 5.4 percentage points higher than that of mortgages, and 7.2 percentage 
points higher than vehicle loans. Columns 2 through 5 display the results from separately adding 
linear terms related to equity, payment amount, interest rate, and loan age to the regression. The 
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equity and loan age variables are the only ones that reduced the estimated coefficient on student 
loans by themselves. 
Column 6 displays the results when the entire vector of linear loan characteristics is included. 
Controlling for these observed loan characteristics, the delinquency rate on student loans is 
predicted to be 3.6 percentage points higher than mortgages, and 5.4 percentage points higher 
than vehicle loans. 
As expected, equity in the asset is negatively related to delinquency. Loan age is also predictive 
of delinquency: Older loans are more likely to be behind schedule on payments. The indicator for 
zero equity is surprising: It is small and not statistically significant for home mortgages, and it is 
negative and significant at the 10% level for vehicle loans.  
Column 7 includes squared terms for each of the continuous variables: equity of each loan type, 
loan age, payment amount, and the interest rate.16 Including these terms further reduces the 
estimated coefficient on the student loan indicator to 0.036, while the indicator on vehicle loans 
is 0.018 and is not statistically significant from zero. In sum, observed loan characteristics 
reduced the “student loan effect” on delinquency probability by 33% relative to mortgages, and 
by 25% relative to vehicle loans. Linear terms account for nearly all of the model’s explanation 
of the student loan effect on repayment prioritization. 
I replicate the analysis including households with a respondent age over 45 years old and display 
results in Appendix Table A2. The results are similar. In addition, I re-estimate the model using a 
single implicate (instead of all five) and using survey weights. The coefficients, displayed in 
Appendix Table A3 are similar in both magnitude and statistical significance. 
                                                     
16 Additional higher order terms dramatically increased standard errors of estimates. The coefficients on the 
quadratic terms are not displayed in the table in order to save space. 
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Section 7 Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence that households place a low priority on student loan repayment 
relative to other debts. When households are able to pay some—but not all—of their debts, they 
overwhelmingly choose to miss their student loan payments. This suggests that changes to the 
student loan system that encourage repayment could reduce student loan delinquencies, while 
possibly increasing delinquencies in other debt markets.  
The small sample counts and cross-sectional nature of the data make it difficult to determine 
empirically why households are making these decisions, although theory can guide us. Prior 
research suggests that equity, liquidity, credit scores, and consequences of non-repayment matter 
for unilateral debt repayment. It seems reasonable to conclude that such factors would enter a 
consumer’s decision to prioritize one debt over another.  
While there is evidence that households are prioritizing student loans below other debts, the 
evidence isn’t perfectly clear on which factors drive this decision. However, some observations 
can be made. First, home equity matters both for predicting delinquency and for explaining the 
student loan effect. Households with more ownership of the asset are less likely to fall behind in 
their payments and risk repossession by the lender.  
Loan age also matters for predicting delinquency and explaining the student loan effect. 
Households are more likely to miss payments on older loans, all else equal. This could reflect 
psychological factors such as individuals being more “attached” to newer assets, and therefore 
prioritizing the debt behind those assets.  
There are some unexpected observations. The sign on interest rates is near zero and statistically 
insignificant. To minimize interest paid, consumers should be paying off loans with higher 
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interest rates first, although this may be mitigated by the loan amount. The coefficient on 
payment amount is statistically significant, but very small in magnitude: A $1,000 increase in 
payment amount increases the expected probability of delinquency by 1 percentage point. While 
household fixed effects control for some ability to pay measures such as income and wealth, I 
expected that payment size would be more positively correlated with delinquency rates because 
the payment of larger loan amounts may be very difficult for income-constrained households.  
One might expect a number of other factors to influence the decision-making of borrowers, yet 
these are difficult to capture in the currently available data. Households may face varying 
consequences of non-repayment, depending on their individual loan terms. Households may also 
have internal probabilities on their own likelihood of bankruptcy, or future income streams. They 
may also have varying degrees of knowledge about the consequences of default.  
With respect to student loan repayment, an ideal data set would combine the college experience, 
debt, and demographic variables available in the popular National Center for Education Statistics 
surveys with a fuller set of income, debt, and repayment patterns over time. NCES data sets do 
not allow us to observe whether students are delinquent on either their student loans or any other 
debts. The Survey of Consumer Finances and the Equifax/Consumer Credit Panel under 
management of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York contain rich information on household 
debt and repayment, but scant information on the educational experiences and demographics of 
student loan borrowers.   
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Figure III.1. Fraction of Single-Loan Households Paying Behind Schedule by Debt Burden. Data from the 2001-2010 Surveys 
of Consumer Finance. Sample includes households with exactly one installment loan in repayment and with respondent age 
under 45 years old. Only the first survey implicate is used. Within each loan type, debt burden is defined as the monthly debt 
payment divided by monthly income. Debt burden bins start at one percentage points wide and increase to five points as counts
diminish. Reported are the fraction of households paying behind schedule within each bin. Minimum 10 households per bin.
Trendline: Education Loans
Trendline: VehicleLoans
Trendline: Mortgage Loans
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Unweighted 
Count of 
Households
Restricted to 
Respondents 
Under Age 45
Number of Households 19,653 7,658
Households with a Student Loan and Home Mortgage Only in Repayment 270 160
Households with a Student Loan and Vehicle Loan Only in Repayment 217 166
Households with a Home Mortgage and Vehicle Loan Only in Repayment 2,913 1,358
Households with a Student Loan, Home Mortgage, and Vehicle Loan in Repayment 370 238
Single-Loan Households with a Student Loan in Repayment 270 212
Single-Loan Households with a Home Mortgage in Repayment 3,909 1,403
Single-Loan Households with a Vehicle Loan in Repayment 1,741 931
Table III.1. Prevalence of Installment Loans among Households.
Notes:  Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Household counts are unweighted. "In repayment" is defined as having a non-missing response to the survey 
question asking if the household is ahead of schedule, on schedule, or behind schedule on the loan. Loans other than home mortgage, vehicle, and student loans are disregarded. The 
first implicate was used for these calculations. The "age 45" restriction considers the age of the survey respondent only.
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Unweighted Number of 
Households
Has a Student Loan and either Mortgage or Vehicle Loan in Repayment 564
Has a Student Loan and Mortgage in Repayment 398
Has a Student Loan and Vehicle Loan in Repayment 404
Has a Student Loan and Mortgage in Repayment and Exactly One is Behind Schedule 42
Has a Student Loan and Vehicle Loan in Repayment and Exactly One is Behind Schedule 51
Has either of above Two Categories 70
Table III.2. Households which Reveal a Repayment Preference across Two Installment Loans.
Notes: Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Household counts are unweighted. Limited to households with a survey 
respondent no older than age 45 and with at least two types of loans in repayment. "In repayment" is defined as having a non-missing response to the 
survey question asking if the household is ahead of schedule, on schedule, or behind schedule on the loan. "Behind Schedule" is defined as paying at 
least one loan within a loan type behind schedule for that same survey question. Loans other than home mortgage, vehicle, and student loans are 
disregarded.  The first implicate was used for these calculations. 
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Other Loan in Repayment
Unweighted 
Count of 
Households
On Schedule 
Both Loans
Behind Schedule on 
at least one Student 
Loan but not Other 
Loan
Behind Schedule in 
at least one Other 
Loan but not Student 
Loans
Behind 
Schedule Both 
Loans
Mortgage 398 88.6% 8.4% 2.0% 1.0%
Vehicle Loan 404 85.4% 9.3% 3.1% 2.2%
Table III.3. Delinquency Rates Conditional on Having a Student Loan and Another Loan in Repayment.
Notes: Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Household counts are unweighted. Limited to households with a survey 
respondent no older than age 45 and with at least two types of loans in repayment. "In repayment" is defined as having a non-missing response to the 
survey question asking if the household is ahead of schedule, on schedule, or behind schedule on the loan. "Behind Schedule" is defined as paying at least 
one loan within a loan type behind schedule for that same survey question. Loans other than home mortgage, vehicle, and student loans are disregarded. 
The first implicate was used in these calculations. Means are unweighted.
Households Facing Delinquency Choice
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2001 2004 2007 2010 Total
Repay Mortgage but not Student Loan 89% 78% 86% 75% 81%
Repay Vehicle but not Student Loan 85% 67% 88% 67% 75%
Table III.4. Repayment Prioritization among Loan Pairs over Time.
Notes:  Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Limited to households with a survey respondent no older than age 45 and with at 
least two types of loans in repayment. The sample consists of all households delinquent in exactly one debt among the loan pair. The reported value 
represents those sample households behind schedule on the student loan. The first implicate was used in these calculations, and annual means were 
calculated without survey weights. The "Total" column is a weighted average (by households) across the survey years. 
100
Number of Households
Delinquency Rate on 
Single Installment 
Loan
Single-Loan Households with a Student Loan in Repayment 212 28.8%
Single-Loan Households with a Home Mortgage Loan in Repayment 1,403 3.1%
Single-Loan Households with a Vehicle Loan in Repayment 931 7.1%
Table III.5. Delinquency Rates of Single-Loan-Type Households.
Notes:  Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Limited to households with respondent age no older than 45. The 
sample consists of all age-eligible households with just one loan type among student loan, mortgage, and vehicle loans in repayment. "In 
repayment" is defined as having a non-missing response to the survey question asking if the household is ahead of schedule, on schedule, or 
behind schedule on the loan.  Delinquency is defined as being behind schedule on at least one loan within each loan type. Household counts 
are unweighted. All imputations were used in these calculations. Percentages are unweighted.
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Education Mortgage Vehicle
Unweighted Number of Households with Loan of Each Type 794 3,441 2,799
Mean Loan Age (Years) 4.1 3.1 1.7
Mean Loan Interest Rate (Percentage Points) 5.7 6.3 8.2
Mean Payment Amount ($100s) 2.4 16.3 4.6
Mean Equity in Home 0.00 0.34 0.00
Fraction Households with Zero Equity in Home 0.00 0.07 0.00
Mean Equity in Vehicle 0.00 0.00 0.44
Fraction Households with Zero Equity in Vehicle 0.00 0.00 0.10
Has Two Loan Types 0.41 0.44 0.54
Has Three Loan Types 0.30 0.07 0.09
Has an Education Loan 1.00 0.12 0.14
Has a Mortgage Loan 0.50 1.00 0.57
Has a Vehicle Loan 0.51 0.46 1.00
Notes: Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Household counts are unweighted. Limited to households with a survey respondent no 
older than age 45 and at least one student loan, vehicle loan, or mortgage in repayment. "In repayment" is defined as having a non-missing response to the survey 
question asking if the household is ahead of schedule, on schedule, or behind schedule on the loan. Loans other than home mortgage, vehicle, and student loans 
are disregarded. All survey implicates are used in these calculations.
Table III.6. Summary Statistics of Loan-Level Model Covariates.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Education Loan Indicator 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.063*** 0.054*** 0.043*** 0.037** 0.036**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)
Vehicle Loan Indicator -0.018*** -0.012 -0.011 -0.017*** -0.009 -0.001 -0.018
(0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.018) (0.021)
Fraction Equity in Home -0.019 -0.049* -0.176***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.046)
Fraction Equity in Vehicle -0.012 -0.015 0.023
(0.025) (0.025) (0.063)
Has Zero Equity in Home 0.017 0.004 -0.046
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030)
Has Zero Equity in Vehicle -0.069* -0.070* -0.049
(0.036) (0.036) (0.047)
Payment Amount ($100s) 0.001* 0.001** 0.002***
0.000 0.000 (0.001)
Interest Rate (Percentage Points) 0.000 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Loan Age (Years) 0.007*** 0.008*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Constant 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.036*** 0.037** 0.035
(0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.024)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Squared Terms of Continuous Variables No No No No No No Yes
Unique Households 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867
Estimated Adjusted R-squared 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82
Table III.7.  Loan-Level Model Probability of Delinquency.
Notes : Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Observations are at the household-imputation-loan level. Mortgage Loan indicator is the excluded 
category. All imputations are used in these regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and  account for multiple imputation. Estimated R-Squared comes from 
a least squares regression using a single implicate. Survey weights are not used.
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APPENDIX I.A 
Background Information on Student Loans 
Section 1 Description of Federal Loan Types 
There are three types of federal loans students may obtain while enrolled. Subsidized Stafford 
loans are means tested and interest is paid by the government while the student is enrolled. 
Unsubsidized Stafford loans are not means tested. Payments are not required while the borrower 
is enrolled, although interest accumulates once the loan is disbursed. Stafford loans have annual 
loan limits, often well below the cost of attendance. PLUS loans can be made to parents and 
graduate students to cover any remaining costs not covered by grants or Stafford loans. These are 
unsubsidized. Each of these loans have the same published rates, limits, and eligibility, whether 
in the Direct or Guarantee program. 
Section 2 School Switching and Selection into Federal Student Loan Programs  
Changes to federal accounting rules in the early 1990s—along with estimates that a direct 
lending program may be cheaper to taxpayers—led to the roll-out of the Direct Loan program in 
1994. Early surveys by the Office of Postsecondary Education report relatively high satisfaction 
in the Direct Program, as financial aid officers only had to work with a single lender (OPE, 
1996). Market share in the Direct Program increased rapidly and peaked at 33% of new loan 
volume in 1997.  
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However, a new Congress opposed to the Direct Loan program passed regulations, effective in 
1997, prohibiting the Department of Education from marketing the Direct Loan program. Over 
the next ten years, the Guarantee program steadily regained market share. Investigations by U.S. 
News & World Report (2003), whistle blowing by small private lenders (2006), and settlements 
and reports by the Attorney General’s Office of New York (2007) disclosed a pattern of 
kickbacks and inducements by private lenders to financial aid offices to return to the Guarantee 
program and obtain placement at the top of preferred lender lists. By 2007, just 19% of newly 
originated loans were disbursed through the Direct Loan program. 
These practices came to light just prior to turmoil in the financial markets beginning in 2008. 
During this financial crisis, many lenders voluntarily exited the federal student loan market as 
yields plummeted and the cost of capital rose. New federal regulations passed in 2009 eliminated 
the Guarantee program and as of July 1, 2010, all newly disbursed federal loans must be 
originated through the Direct Loan program. 
Section 3 Cohort Default Rates Defined 
The repayment cohorts are defined by the end of the fiscal year which runs from October 1 
through September 30. A student graduating in May 2008 who uses the six-month grace period 
will enter repayment in November 2008. Students entering repayment between Oct 1, 2008 and 
Sep 30, 2009 make up the denominator of the 2009 cohort default rate. Students who default by 
the end of the next fiscal year enter the numerator of the cohort default rate. The numerator of 
this ratio includes all students in the cohort who default on any of their federal loans by 
September 30, 2010, even if the defaulted loan was disbursed through another institution.   
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The Information for Financial Aid Professionals (IFAP) website within the Department of 
Education produces a handbook that describes cohort default rates, appeals, and exceptions in 
great detail. The latest version can be found at:  
http://www.ifap.ed.gov/cdrguidelenderga/3YearFY11CohortDefaultRateGuideGALender.html  
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APPENDIX I.B 
Modeling Lender Incentives for Interventions 
When a borrower misses a payment and becomes one step closer to default, lenders must decide 
whether it is worth expending resources in an intervention attempt to move the borrower back to 
on-time repayment. Moreover, because of the principal-agent framework, the lender will create a 
general intervention policy that agents (collection officers) can follow. 
Delinquent borrowers can be classified into three mutually exclusive categories: those who will 
recover regardless of whether the lender provides an intervention, those who will default 
regardless of an intervention, and the marginal borrowers (or compliers) who recover if and only 
if there is an intervention performed. For analytical ease, suppose the fraction of each borrower 
type is fixed across the Direct and Guarantee program, and each type has a probability of 
occurring in the population denoted by 𝛼1,𝛼2, and 𝛼3 respectively.  
We can imagine this holds for the entire population of delinquent borrowers, or within buckets of 
observed characteristics (e.g., borrowers who attended a one-year school and missed a payment 
in the first year after exiting college). Lenders should choose to provide an intervention if and 
only if the expected value of intervention exceeds the cost of the intervention (beyond the 
minimum effort required to satisfy the default guarantee claim). 
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I define: 
𝑉𝑅 ≡ Net present value of a loan in repayment. 
𝑉𝐷 ≡ Net present value of a loan in default. 
𝐶 ≡ Cost of an intervention required to bring borrower to recovery.  
Because type 1 borrowers always recover into repayment, type 2 borrowers always default, and 
type 3 borrowers recover only in an intervention, we can denote: 
E[V|Intervention] = α1VR + α2VD + α3VR − 𝐶 as the expected value of an intervention, and 
E[V|Min Effort] = α1VR + α2VD + α3VD as the expected value of performing the minimum 
effort. 
Therefore, the lender performs an intervention if 𝛼3(𝑉𝑅 − 𝑉𝐷) ≥ 𝐶. 
Then there exists a threshold 𝐶∗, which makes the lender indifferent between exerting the 
minimum effort and performing the intervention. 
I assume that 𝛼3 is fixed across the Direct and Guarantee programs. Moreover, I claim 𝛼3 > 0 
because Sallie Mae is willing to exert additional intervention resources to delinquent private loan 
borrowers, as discussed earlier. Then 
𝜕𝐶∗
𝜕𝑉𝑅
> 0 and 𝜕𝐶∗
𝜕𝑉𝐷
< 0. 
Because 𝑉𝑅 is simply the net present value of a loan in repayment, this value is also constant 
across the Direct and Guarantee loan programs. But, in the Guarantee program, 𝑉𝐷 ≥ 0.97 ∗
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 due to the default guarantee, the additional income the lender may collect through late 
fees, and the chance of being hired as a collection agent. In the Direct Loan program, the 
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expected value of a loan in default is 𝑉𝐷 ≤ 0.87 ∗ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵, according to the Department of 
Education’s budget justifications. Because 𝑉𝐷
𝐷𝐷 < 𝑉𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺and 𝜕𝐶∗𝜕𝑉𝐷 < 0, this leads to the prediction 
𝐶𝐷𝐷
∗ > 𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺∗ . 
In other words, there is an increased willingness to provide an intervention in the Direct Loan 
program relative to the Guarantee program. If I assume that there are different intervention rules 
for different buckets of borrowers based on observed characteristics, then Direct Loan lenders 
will be willing to intervene for more of these buckets of borrowers. 
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APPENDIX I.C 
Technical Details of the School-x-Year Model 
Estimated impacts on default rates due to Direct Loan participation are driven by those schools 
switching programs throughout the sample period. How representative are these schools? First, 
the analysis sample covers 96% of borrowers entering repayment between 2003 and 2011. Table 
C1 displays statistics of schools across programs in the two distinct periods: 2000–2008, and 
2008–2011. Table 1 in the main paper displayed the characteristics of schools across program 
participation for the entire sample. 
Switching programs was not very prevalent during much of the sample period.  Between 2000 
and 2008, just 7% of schools participated in both programs.1 Among schools participating in 
both programs, these schools spent on average 4.4 years in the Guarantee program, 3.7 years in 
the Direct program, and just under 1 year participating in both programs within the same year 
(typically as a transition between programs).  During this period from 2000 to 2008, 75% of 
schools were in the Guarantee program every year, and 18% of schools were in the Direct 
program every year.   
In order to have participated in both programs during the 2000–2008 period, the school would 
have had to first switch into Direct Loans in the late 1990s and then switch back to the Guarantee 
program. Thus, it is not surprising that those schools resemble a blend of the Direct-only and the 
Guarantee-only schools.  For example, one-year for-profit schools make up 28% of the Direct-
                                                          
1 This includes the 24 schools that were “mixed only” throughout the sample. 
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only schools, 10% of the Guarantee-only schools, and 17% of Switcher schools.  Four-year 
private schools make up 16% of Direct-only schools, 33% of Guarantee-only schools, and 25% 
of Switcher schools.   
The pattern of loan program switching began to shift toward the Direct Loan program in 2008.  
This was coincident with both negative publicity and regulations surrounding the kickbacks in 
the Guarantee program, as well as the voluntary exiting of many student lenders from the market.  
Among schools which participated in both programs between 2008 and 2011, 2.4 years were 
spent in the Guarantee program, 1.2 years in the Direct Loan program, and 0.4 years 
participating in both. (Many schools were mixed in 2009–10 only.) Twenty-six percent of the 
schools were in the Direct program during the entire “involuntary switching” period. Schools 
participating in both programs during the involuntary switching period overwhelmingly come 
from schools that were Guarantee-only during the voluntary switching period 2000–2008. 
Time-varying student characteristics used as controls include  
 racial composition,  
 the fraction of independent students,  
 the 75th percentile SAT math,  
 SAT reading,  
 ACT composite scores,  
 the proportion taking the SAT and ACT,  
 the fraction graduating within 150% of program duration,  
 logged cost of attendance,  
 graduate and undergraduate enrollment,  
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 the proportion of freshmen taking out loans,  
 the average student loan amount,  
 the proportions of independent and dependent students classified as “low income,” 
 the proportion of total federal loans disbursed which are parent PLUS, grad PLUS, or 
subsidized Stafford, and  
 the fraction of students obtaining Pell grants.  
While the cohort default rates exclude PLUS loans, the existence of these loans may help 
describe the student population as well as the level of parental support. Subsidized Stafford loans 
provide another measure of low-income student loan borrowers. These loans also influence the 
financial incentives of lenders, as interest on subsidized loans is paid by the government when a 
struggling borrower is in forbearance.  
TICAS data covers the academic years ending 2001, and 2004–2012.  Data for 2002 and 2003 
are estimated using linear interpolation methods for those schools with data from both 2001 and 
later years only.  In order to match the years available in the Title IV reports, this study uses the 
2001 values in the TICAS panel as a best estimate for the 2000 values.2, 3  
Section 1 Event Study Framework 
Estimating the impact of Direct Loan participation on default rates in an event study framework 
allows for the observation of non-linear pre-trends. This methodology is complicated by the fact 
that program switching goes in both directions over the sample period. I can get around this, 
                                                          
2 Approximately 20% of schools had no data available in 2001 and so linear interpolation wasn’t used.  As a test of 
sensitivity, the model was estimated both with missing data for these schools in 2000–2003 as well as using 2004 
values for each of these years.  Results are similar in magnitude and significance. 
3 Imputation flags are set to unity for those variables with initially missing data. Missing value indicators are set to 
unity (and variable values set to zero) for any variables which remain missing after imputations. 
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however, by splitting the data into the two distinct periods and dropping the small number of 
schools that switched from Guarantee to Direct in the earlier period. This sharply reduces power, 
which is why results are reported in the appendices, and why the distributed lag model is the 
preferred estimation strategy. 
I estimated equation (7) below using both an unbalanced and balanced panel. First, the sample is 
limited to the high-baseline default, low-enrollment one-year and two-year for-profit schools.  
The results from the aggregate model suggest the impacts of Direct Loan participation are 
concentrated among these schools. To increase what limited power is available, I combined these 
two sectors.  
Next, I estimated an unbalanced panel using all available years for non-switcher schools, but for 
switcher schools I used only the years prior to the final switch to the Direct Loan program. I also 
dropped all schools that switched multiple times prior to the final involuntary switch to the 
Direct Loan program, leaving the sample with twenty-one switcher schools. This allowed me to 
observe the estimated impact of switching voluntarily from the Direct to the Guarantee program.  
(7) 𝑦𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐵ℎ𝑠,𝑠+𝑖𝑖=3𝑖=−4 + ∑ 𝛿𝑙𝑋𝑠,𝑠−𝑙𝑛𝑙=0 + 𝜃𝑐𝑠 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜀𝑠𝑠. 
All variables are defined as in Equation (1), but 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐵ℎ𝑠,𝑠+𝑖 represents binary indicators for 
whether the school switched from Direct to Guarantee in period t+i. The excluded category is 
represented by 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐵ℎ𝑠,𝑠−4. Counts become scarce among switcher schools beyond (i=-4) and 
(i=+3).4 Thus, for this unbalanced panel only, I combined (i=-8) through (i=-4) into the (i=-4) 
category, and combined (i=+3) through (i=+8) into the (i=+3) category. Even so, the confidence 
intervals sharply increase around (i=+3). 
                                                          
4 Each of these categories would have the indicator turned on for fewer than 10 observations.  
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Figure C1 shows a sharp downward trend in default rates among switcher schools leading into 
the switch toward the Guarantee program in the voluntary switching period, followed by a sharp 
increase in default rates following the switch. This suggests that results from the distributed lag 
model may understate the impact of the Direct Loan program. 
I re-estimated equation (7) using a balanced panel. I included schools that switched between 
2003 and 2007, which allows for these schools to have at least three years of pre/post switch 
data. To be included in the balanced sample, all schools must have observations from (t-3) 
through (t+3). Unfortunately, among the high-default, low-enrollment schools, there are just 
three switcher schools meeting these criteria. As a result, I instead used the sample of high-
default schools with either high or low average enrollment over the period, increasing the 
number of switcher schools to twelve in this balanced panel.  
Figure C2 displays the results. The reversal in trends is not nearly as sharp as in the unbalanced 
panel, but there still seems to be a negative trend in default rates leading up to the voluntary 
switch into the Guarantee program.  Again, this suggests that the main results are somewhat 
understated. 
In order to obtain the impact of “involuntary switching” I then estimated the same model on the 
second period, defining switcher schools as those who switched into the Direct Loan program 
between 2009 and 2011. I estimated the model using both a balanced and unbalanced panel 
among the high-default, low-enrollment one-year and two-year for-profit schools.  
The unbalanced panel includes 136 switcher schools, and includes observations from (t-5) 
through (t+1). I excluded (t+2) because that would be estimated from just one cohort (2009 
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switchers). Counts are large enough that I did not need to combine periods, as in the voluntary 
switching period.  
Figure C3 displays the results of the event study estimating the impact of switching into the 
Direct Loan program. There is a small downward trend in default rates, suggesting that the 
estimated results may be somewhat overstated. But there is still a large gap between the trend 
and estimated (t+0) coefficient. The (t+1) coefficient is only estimated from the 2009 and 2010 
switchers (missing more than half of the switcher schools) and thus the confidence interval 
increases sharply at this point. 
The balanced panel uses all available years for non-switchers, but restricts switcher schools to 
those that have at least three pre-periods and the initial switch period. (Note that the bulk of 
switchers will not have a t+1 period, because 2011 is the last available repayment cohort.) This 
reduced the number of switcher schools to 71, and there are just 12 observations where the (t+1) 
indicator is turned on. 
Figure C4 displays the results. The results are similar to the unbalanced panel. Again, there 
seems to be a small downward trend, but the estimate at (t+0) does not seem to be explained by 
the trend in coefficients starting from the excluded category. The confidence interval is large at 
all points and doubles in size at (t+1), so I do not display that coefficient. 
To summarize, the event study method is hampered by the fact that program switching goes in 
both directions. I split the sample and focused on each switching period separately. In the earlier 
period, there seems to be a slight downward trend in default rates, suggesting that the aggregate 
results may understate the impact of the Direct Loan program. In the later period, the downward 
trend suggests that results may be overstating the impact of the Direct Loan program. In none of 
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the cases does a pre-trend in estimated coefficients seem to explain the bulk of the post-period 
estimated impact of Direct Loan participation. 
Section 2 Does Direct Loan Participation Predict Changes in Observed Student 
Characteristics? 
I re-estimated equation (5), replacing default rates on the left-hand side with eight observed 
characteristics that have relatively few missing observations. These include the fraction of 
students who are black, Hispanic, or female. It also includes graduation rates (within 150% of 
expected time-to-completion), the fraction of undergrads enrolled fulltime, the average freshman 
loan size, the fraction of freshmen with any student loans, and the fraction of annual loans 
disbursed as subsidized Stafford loans. The analysis sample is made up of high-baseline-default, 
low-enrollment one-year and two-year for-profit schools, as described in the paper. The only 
change from equation (5) is that I dropped contemporaneous time-varying student characteristics. 
For example, I included a one-year lag of fraction black but exclude (t-0) fraction black. For 
sensitivity, I also removed all time-varying student characteristics, and the results are similar. 
I utilized a multivariate regression framework and simultaneously estimated the model with each 
dependent variable. Table C2 displays ∑ 𝛽𝑙
𝑛
𝑙=0 , the sum of estimated coefficients on the lagged 
program participation indicators. At the five percent level, Direct Loan participation does not 
predict significant differences in any of the dependent variables. At the ten percent level, Direct 
Loan participation predicts a lower graduation rate and a reduced fraction of subsidized loans. 
The relationship between Direct Loan participation and reduced graduation rates should 
meaningfully understate the impact of participation on default rates, as attainment is consistently 
found to be an important predictor of default. 
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APPENDIX I.D 
Technical Details of the Student-Level Model 
Section 1 Description of Analysis Sample in Student-Level Model 
Table D1 displays summary statistics comparing the full sample to the analysis sample for each 
time period, as well as the combined surveys, excluding all students at four-year schools. The 
analysis sample in both years is restricted to student loan holders. The average loan (conditional 
on having one) is smaller for the analysis group and has a greater proportion of female, African 
American, and independent students than the full sample. The students have lower incomes in 
the analysis sample. There is a sharp decline in the proportion of students attending two-year 
public schools, along with a corresponding increase in the proportion of students attending one-
year and two-year for-profit schools. This is due to the restriction requiring at least one loan 
disbursed. 
Section 2 Assignment to Single “Main” School 
Students may attend multiple schools yet they can only be assigned to one school. For both this 
analysis, and for published cohort default rates, schools are responsible for the performance of 
their students—regardless of whether defaulted loans were disbursed at another school. In this 
analysis, students are assigned to a single “main” school so that we may include school fixed 
effects. The main school is defined according to the following hierarchy. Once one of these rules 
is met, the main school can no longer be affected by subsequent rules. 
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First, for students attending just one institution, that is their assigned school. Second, students are 
assigned the school at which they earn their highest degree. Third, students are assigned the 
school at which they are enrolled full time for the most number of months. Fourth, students are 
assigned the school at which they are enrolled part time for the most number of months. Fifth, 
students are assigned the school with the highest level attended (e.g., a two-year school over a 
one-year school if no degree was earned). Finally, students are assigned to the last school 
attended if none of the above rules led to a match.   
Because students may attend multiple schools but only be assigned to one school, it is possible in 
the analysis sample for a school to appear to participate in both student loan programs, even if it 
only participated in one.  For example, suppose a student obtains a Direct Loan from one 
community college, transfers to a second community college participating in the Guarantee 
program, and earns a degree from the second school. The second college would be the main 
school, and thus that school is assigned students with loans from both programs.   
Section 3 Within-School Variation in Program Participation 
For the following table, school participation in the Direct Loan (or Guarantee) program is 
defined as having at least one student assigned to that school having a loan disbursed through the 
Direct Loan program, regardless from which school that student obtained the loan. 
Table D2 displays how these main schools represent students with loans across both programs.  
Specifically, there are 160 schools that have at least one student in the analysis sample with loans 
from each student loan program. There are 850 students represented at these schools, comprising 
approximately one-third of the population sample. 
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Section 4 Variable List for Student and School Controls 
The vector 𝑆𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑠 consists of individual student characteristics, including indicators for race, 
gender, parental education, degree attainment, major, transfer status, debt, and the number of 
months between the last enrollment date and the repayment status date. Employment status and 
earnings in the final follow-up period could be endogenous predictors, but are controlled for in 
an extended specification. The results are similar.  
The vector 𝑆𝐵ℎ𝑠𝑠 consists of time-varying school characteristics including sector, racial 
composition, total costs net of grants, published total cost of attendance, and Barron’s selectivity 
obtained directly from BPS. This vector includes fraction female, low-income dependent, low-
income independent, undergraduates attending fulltime, freshman taking out loans, 150% cohort 
graduation rates, graduate and undergraduate enrollment, freshman retention rates, and the 
average freshman loan amount from the TICAS panel.5 
Section 5 Building up the Student-Level Model 
The second column adds loan-specific variables: dollars disbursed, fixed effects for number of 
loans, and loan age (months in repayment). Months in repayment is defined as the number of 
months between the last month enrolled and August of the final survey year (2001 or 2009). 
Column 3 adds student characteristics: high school performance and test scores, race and 
ethnicity, gender, and parental characteristics including highest education and income. There are 
also indicators for dependency status, marital status, whether any dependents, and number of 
dependent children. Column 4 adds institution characteristics: sector (combination of institution 
level and control), Barron’s selectivity rating, and others from TICAS and the Department of 
                                                          
5 Values from 2004 in the panel are assigned to BPS 2004 observations, while values from 2001 in the panel are 
assigned to the BPS 1996 observations. 
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Education as already described. Some of these values vary within schools over time, and do not 
fall out with the inclusion of school fixed effects. Column 5 adds indicators for college 
experience: attainment, major, fixed effects for number of schools attended, number of months 
enrolled full-time and part-time, and college grades.  
Section 6 Testing the Identifying Assumption 
As described in the main paper, student-level outcomes are time-invariant. As such, I could not 
test the internal validity of the model using the event study analysis, or include linear time trends. 
I was able to test whether Direct Loan participation predicts observed characteristics, as a test for 
the existence of unobserved changes in the student population concurrent with Direct Loan use. 
As reported in Section 7.3, Table D3 displays the results of the multiple-equation regression 
model. Each dependent variable was predicted simultaneously in order to account for multiple 
hypothesis testing. Of the eleven observed characteristics chosen (because there are relatively 
few missing variables), Direct Loan participation predicts an increase in the likelihood that a 
student’s parent has at least a BA, and a reduced likelihood that the student earned a GED. This 
suggests that, within the sample population contained in the BPS, Direct Loan participation is 
correlated with a somewhat more advantaged population.  
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Figure I.C1. Coefficients from Event Study Model Estimating the Impact of Switching from the Direct to Guarantee 
Program. Unbalanced Panel. The sample includes only high-default, low-enrollment less-than-four-year for-profit 
schools switching from the Direct to Guarantee program.  Excluded group is (t-4) which combines all pre-periods (t-4) 
through (t-8). (t+3) combines (t+3) through (t+8) because counts are small in these ranges.
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Figure I.C2. Coefficients from Event Study Model Estimating the Impact of Switching from the Direct to Guarantee 
Program. Balanced Panel. The sample includes only high-default, low-enrollment less-than-four-year for-profit schools 
switching from the Direct to Guarantee program.  Schools of all enrollment levels are included for power. Excluded 
group is (t-3). Among switcher schools, keep only observations between (t-3) and (t+3). All others are dropped. All 
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Figure I.C3. Coefficients from Event Study Model Estimating the Impact of Switching from the Guarantee to Direct 
Program. Unbalanced Panel.  The sample includes only high-default, low-enrollment less-than-four-year for-profit 
schools switching from the Guarantee to Direct program after 2009.  Excluded group is (t-5). All observations (t-6) and 
earlier for switcher schools are dropped.
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Figure I.C4. Coefficients from Event Study Model Estimating the Impact of Switching from the Guarantee to Direct 
Program. Balanced Panel.  The sample includes only high-default, low-enrollment less-than-four-year for-profit schools 
switching from the Guarantee to Direct program after 2009. (t-5) is excluded. Switchers only included for observations 
(t-5) through (t+0). All years of non-switchers are included.
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Guarantee 
Only Direct Only Switch
Guarantee 
Only Direct Only Switch
Unique Schools 3,167 782 271 138 1,164 3,091
Avg Annual Loan Recipients 2,314 3,187 2,970 1,500 3,654 3,994
Avg Annual Default Rate 6.2 6.2 7.4 11.5 9.2 8.6
Avg Loan Amount 4,124 3,989 4,284 6,220 6,075 6,141
Pct Years Direct Only 0.00 0.96 0.41 0.00 0.93 0.29
Pct Years Guarantee Only 0.99 0.00 0.49 0.86 0.00 0.61
Pct Years Mixed Programs 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.09
Four-Year Public Schools 0.13 0.26 0.16 0.02 0.18 0.14
Four-Year Private Schools 0.33 0.16 0.25 0.10 0.13 0.32
Four-Year For-Profit Schools 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05
Two-Year Public Schools 0.22 0.11 0.19 0.29 0.09 0.22
Two-Year For-Profit Schools 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.17 0.11
One-Year For-Profit Schools 0.10 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.38 0.10
Other Sector 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.06
Undergrad Enrollment 4,554 5,583 5,456 2,747 4,559 5,429
Pct Female 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.66 0.72 0.63
Pct Asian 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Pct Black 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.15
Pct Hispanic 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.10
Pct Independent 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.62 0.47 0.44
2008-2011
Notes:  Schools are assigned to the Direct or Guarantee program if at least 90% of loans within a year are disbursed through that 
program.  A school is defined as  a Switch school if it is assigned as a participant in each program for at least one year during the period.  
Guarantee Only schools must not have offered federal loans in 2011. There were 24 and 12 schools in the first and second periods 
respectively that offered both loan types for all years in the sample.
Table I.C1.  Characteristics of Schools across Federal Student Loan Programs.
2000-2008
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Less-than-Four-Year 
Schools
Fraction Freshman with Loans 0.032
(0.038)
Avg Freshman Loan Size 594.1
(377.8)
Pct Subsidized Loans -0.020*
(0.012)
Pct Black -0.010
(0.012)
Pct Hispanic 0.014
(0.009)
Pct Female -0.012
(0.012)
Graduation Rates (150% of Expected Time to Degree) -0.054*
(0.032)
Pct Full-time (Undergraduates only) -0.018
(0.018)
Notes : Each dependent variable is predicted simultaneously using equation (5) on the sample of 
high-default, low-enrollment less-than-four-year for-profit schools. Values displayed are the 
sum of the estimated coefficients on lagged program participation. Contemporaneous student 
characteristics are dropped as independent variables. Standard errors are clustered at the school 
level. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** 
Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table I.C2. Test of Interval Validity in Aggregate Model: Does Direct Loan 
Participation Predict Changes in Observed Student Characteristics? 
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Full 
Sample
Analysis 
Sample
Full 
Sample
Analysis 
Sample
Full 
Sample
Analysis 
Sample
Student Characteristics
Students 2,600 710 7,050 1,780 9,650 2,490
Has a loan 0.50 1.00 0.49 1.00 0.49 1.00
Only Direct 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Only Guarantee 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.79
Has Both Loans 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.07
Total Loan Amount 8,119 7,309 11,872 10,797 10,835 9,802
Female 0.60 0.64 0.61 0.64 0.61 0.64
Asian 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Black 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.21
Hispanic 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16
Independent 0.40 0.47 0.42 0.50 0.42 0.49
Income (independent) 18,142 14,388 24,349 20,334 22,824 18,797
Income (Dependent) 43,290 39,798 52,198 46,324 49,819 44,488
School Characteristics
Unique Schools 840 310 1,130 540 1,620 780
2-Year Public 0.52 0.29 0.67 0.40 0.63 0.37
2-Year For Profit 0.13 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.21
1-Year For Profit 0.21 0.32 0.15 0.31 0.16 0.31
Other Sector 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11
Notes:   Summary statistics from the Beginning Postsecondary Students 1996/2001 and 2004/2009 surveys.  
Sample weights are not used to create group means.  Students at four-year schools are excluded from both 
"full" and "analysis" samples for comparability. Unweighted counts are rounded to the nearest 10 as required 
by the Institute for Education Sciences.
Table I.D1.  Summary Statistics for Student-Level Model.
BPS 1996 BPS 2004 Both Survey Years
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Unique Schools Student Counts
Has Only Students with Guarantee Loans 520 1450
Has Only Students with Direct Loans 90 180
Has Students with Both Loans 160 850
Total 770 2480
Table I.D2.  Loan Holdings of Students within Main School.
Notes:  Counts are derived from National Student Loan Data System extracts in 2001 and 2009.  
Loan holdings are of students enrolled at each assigned "main" university, regardless of which 
school enrolled when loan taken out.  Main schools are defined by the IPEDS Unit ID. Unweighted 
counts are rounded to the nearest 10 as required by the Institute for Education Sciences.
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Parent has at 
least a B.A.
Student has 
a GED Female
Independent 
Student Veteran
Has any 
dependents Married
Single 
Parent Black Hispanic Age
Has Only Direct Loans 0.186* -0.289** 0.062 -0.015 -0.018 -0.131 -0.130 -0.214 -0.184 0.124 -0.820
(0.095) (0.121) (0.108) (0.134) (0.043) (0.136) (0.143) (0.134) (0.118) (0.109) (2.512)
Has Both Direct and Guarantee Loans 0.131* -0.080 0.033 0.129 -0.011 -0.164* -0.111 0.099 -0.040 -0.026 0.572
(0.068) (0.087) (0.077) (0.096) (0.031) (0.098) (0.103) (0.096) (0.085) (0.078) (1.802)
Observations 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580
R-squared 0.362 0.278 0.588 0.352 0.205 0.322 0.254 0.309 0.432 0.528 0.299
Notes : Dependent variables (column headers) are predicted simultaneously using equation (6) on the sample of less-than-four-year for-profit schools. Contemporaneous student characteristics are dropped as independent 
variables. Each observation uses the survey weight associated with being observed in both the initial interview and final follow-up period. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. Displayed observations are 
unweighted and rounded to 10 as required by IES. * Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically significant at the 5% level; *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table I.D3. Test of Interval Validity in Student-Level Model: Does Direct Loan Participation Predict Changes in Observed Student Characteristics? 
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APPENDIX II.A 
Technical Data Appendix 
Section 1 Population Estimates by Age-Year-Puma 
I seek to obtain the number of individuals at each age within a year and a puma. I use three key 
sources of data to estimate these population counts. First, the Census provides intercensal 
population estimates at the county level for five-year age buckets (e.g., the number of individuals 
between the ages of 16 and 20 in County X in year T). The Census will not provide this data for 
individual ages, although it exists. 
Second, I estimate the proportion of individuals at each individual age within the five-year 
buckets at each year and county (e.g., 18-year-olds make up 22% of 16–20-year-olds in County 
X in year T). I use the 2010 decennial Census to obtain counts of individual ages for each county 
in 2010. I then assume no net differences in mobility by age to estimate the population counts for 
each individual age in prior years. That is, the number of 19-year-olds in County X in 2010 
would be equal to the number of 18-year-olds in County X in 2009. I use these estimated 
population counts to calculate the desired proportions within each age bucket. I multiply these 
estimated proportions (e.g., the proportion of 16–20-year-olds that are age 18) by the official 
county-level population counts for the 5-year age buckets to approximate the number of 
individuals for each age-year-county. 
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Finally, I use data from the Missouri Census Data Center to first map counties to 2012 puma 
definitions, and then to map 2012 puma to 2000 puma definitions (in use through 2011). These 
are the population counts used in the final denominators to calculate the fraction of individuals 
within a puma-year-age that have a credit card.  
Section 2 Components of the 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒂𝒂𝑬 Vector 
Starting with the statewide unemployment rate, I assign each age-year-puma observation a main 
effect for the statewide unemployment rate present when that cohort was between the ages of 18 
and 24. If the age-year-puma hasn’t reached a certain age by the observation year, then the main 
effect for all older ages is set to zero.  For example, individuals who are 21 years old in 2010 will 
be assigned a value for the unemployment rate they faced at age 21 (in 2010), age 20 (in 2009), 
age 19 (in 2008), and age 18 (in 2007). The main effects for the unemployment rate faced at ages 
22, 23, and 24 are all set to zero for that observation year. 
In addition, I create a series of interaction terms. If age18ur represents the unemployment rate 
faced at age 18, the interaction terms include age18ur·age19ur, age18ur·age19ur·age20ur, 
age18ur·age19ur·age20ur·age21ur, age19ur·age20ur, age19ur·age20ur·age21ur, and 
age20ur·age21ur. I replicate these main effects and interaction terms for growth in per-capita 
state GDP and growth in per-capita mortgage balances. 
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APPENDIX III.A 
Robustness to Sample Age Restrictions and Survey Weights 
Section 1 Robustness to Sample Age Restrictions 
Households with adult children may report debt and income across the PEU that isn’t actually 
shared by the household. For example, adult children may be responsible for their own student 
loans while the parents are responsible for the home mortgage as well as the bulk of household 
income and assets. To avoid this, I have restricted the sample to households with a respondent 
age of 45 years old or younger.  
This restriction results in approximately one-third of national student loan debt being 
unaccounted for, according to statistics from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I recreate 
Tables 3 and 7 removing the age restriction from the sample and display the results in Tables A1 
and A2. From Table 3, 81% and 75% of “choice households” were delinquent on the education 
loan among the education-mortgage and education-vehicle loan pairs respectively. Inclusive of 
all ages, Table A1 shows that 79% and 80% of choice households were delinquent on the 
education loan among the education-mortgage and education-vehicle loan pairs respectively. 
Table A2 displays the coefficients from re-estimating Model 1 as displayed in Table 7. I find that 
observed characteristics explain 20% of the repayment hierarchy between mortgage and 
education loans and 24% of the hierarchy between vehicle and education loans. The higher-order 
terms appear to reduce the explanatory power of the observed characteristics, perhaps 
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highlighting the disconnect between the characteristics of loans for which the parents or children 
are responsible. 
Section 2 Robustness to Survey Weights 
The Federal Reserve Board provides a program to calculate the appropriate standard errors when 
using all five implicates in a regression model. However, while the stata program allows the use 
of the svy command, it does not allow for the use of explicit regression weights. In addition, 
including thousands of households fixed effects with svy requires more computational resources 
than I have access to. To get around this, I exclude sample weights in the main analysis. 
In order to identify the effects of excluding weights, I re-estimate the model using just the first 
implicate for each household. I no longer need the provided program to calculate the appropriate 
standard errors under multiple imputation and instead estimate a fixed-effects model with and 
without survey weights. I display the estimated coefficients from the preferred specification in 
the paper as well as using just one implicate with and without weights in Appendix Table A3.  
The coefficients and standard errors are fairly close in the two unweighted models.  The 
coefficient of interest on the education loan indicator is reduced from 0.054 to 0.036 using all 
implicates from 0.054 to 0.034 using just the first implicate. In the weighted model, the 
coefficient is reduced from 0.056 to 0.036.  This suggests that I would obtain a very similar 
pattern of coefficient estimates had I been able to use survey weights with all five implicates. 
134
Other Loan in Repayment
Unweighted 
Count of 
Households
On Schedule 
Both Loans
Behind Schedule on 
at least one Student 
Loan but not Other 
Loan
Behind Schedule in 
at least one Other 
Loan but not Student 
Loans
Behind 
Schedule Both 
Loans
Mortgage 640 89.3% 7.6% 2.0% 1.1%
Vehicle Loan 587 85.1% 10.1% 2.5% 2.3%
Table III.A1. Delinquency Rates Conditional on Having a Student Loan and Another Loan in Repayment. Includes All Ages.
Households Facing Delinquency Choice
Notes: Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Household counts are unweighted. Limited to households with at least two types 
of loans in repayment, but no restrictions on age of household respondent. "In repayment" is defined as having a non-missing response to the survey 
question asking if the household is ahead of schedule, on schedule, or behind schedule on the loan. "Behind Schedule" is defined as paying at least one 
loan within a loan type behind schedule for that same survey question. Loans other than home mortgage, vehicle, and student loans are disregarded. All 
survey implicates are used in these calculations. Means are unweighted.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Education Loan Indicator 0.060*** 0.047*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.048***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012)
Vehicle Loan Indicator -0.015*** -0.020 -0.009** -0.015*** -0.009** -0.015 -0.014
(0.004) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016)
Fraction Equity in Home -0.045*** -0.070*** -0.113***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.025)
Fraction Equity in Vehicle -0.013 -0.014 -0.002
(0.017) (0.018) (0.049)
Has Zero Equity in Home 0.040** 0.029 0.007
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Has Zero Equity in Vehicle -0.052* -0.053* -0.047
(0.027) (0.027) (0.037)
Payment Amount ($100s) 0.001** 0.001*** 0.002***
0.000 0.000 0.000
Interest Rate (Percentage Points) 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Loan Age (Years) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.043*** 0.060*** 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.032**
(0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.014)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Squared Terms of Continuous Variables No No No No No No Yes
Unique Households 11,021 11,021 11,021 11,021 11,021 11,021 11,021
Estimated Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31
Table III.A2.  Loan-Level Model Probability of Delinquency. Includes All Ages.
Notes : Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Observations are at the household-imputation-loan level. Mortgage Loan indicator is the excluded category. 
All imputations are used in these regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and  account for multiple imputation. Estimated R-Squared comes from a least 
squares regression using a single implicate. Survey weights are not used.
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Education Loan Indicator 0.054*** 0.036** 0.054*** 0.034** 0.057*** 0.036
(0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.028)
Vehicle Loan Indicator -0.018*** -0.018 -0.018*** -0.021 -0.016** -0.015
(0.006) (0.021) (0.006) (0.018) (0.007) (0.026)
Fraction Equity in Home -0.176*** -0.185*** -0.207**
(0.046) (0.044) (0.103)
Fraction Equity in Vehicle 0.023 0.026 0.006
(0.063) (0.048) (0.073)
Has Zero Equity in Home -0.046 -0.044 -0.050
(0.030) (0.029) (0.053)
Has Zero Equity in Vehicle -0.049 -0.047 -0.065
(0.047) (0.033) (0.056)
Payment Amount ($100s) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Interest Rate (Percentage Points) 0.003 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Loan Age (Years) -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Constant 0.055*** 0.035 0.055*** 0.045** 0.055*** 0.042
(0.004) (0.024) (0.004) (0.020) (0.004) (0.030)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Squared Terms of Continuous Variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Unique Households 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867 4,867
Estimated Adjusted R-squared 0.81 0.82 0.815 0.820 0.818 0.824
Unweighted (1 implicate) Weighted (1 implicate)
Notes : Data comes from the 2001–2010 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Observations are at the household-imputation-loan level. Mortgage Loan indicator 
is the excluded category. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and  account for multiple imputation for the first two columns. The last four 
columns use the first implicate only. R-Squared for the first two columns comes from a least squares regression using a single implicate. Survey weights are 
used only in the last two columns.
Unweighted (5 implicates)
Table III.A3.  Loan-Level Model Probability of Delinquency. Implication of Excluding Survey Weights.
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